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1 Introduction 
Shortly after the terrorist attack against a gas facility in Algeria on January 16
th
 2013, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, opened up for a possible Norwegian military 
contribution to the French Mali intervention – emphasising the need to stop extreme Islamists 
from getting a hold of Northern Mali (Andreassen 2013). How did it come to that Norway, a 
small country in the periphery of Europe, so quickly considered intervening in a region far 
away from its borders and strategic interests? The present thesis is an analysis of Norway’s 
participation in international military operations after the Cold War. By applying the two-
level games of Robert Putnam (1988), the analysis addresses the interaction between 
international and domestic factors, as to examine the Norwegian Government’s constraints 
and options regarding the decision of participation. The main aim of the study is to investigate 
whether there has been a development in Norwegian use of force under international auspices, 
by examining the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. 
The post-Cold War geopolitical context has produced a security climate in which the 
perceptions of security threats are diffuse. There has been an increased amount of 
international operations, with the aim of both peace-keeping and military interventions. Since 
the small contribution in the Gulf War in 1991, Norway has participated in several 
international military operations, including the dropping of the first Norwegian bombs since 
World War II (WWII) in Afghanistan in 2003. In 2011, Norway contributed to the 
intervention in Libya, in which Norwegian F-16 fighter aircrafts delivered almost 600 bombs 
during the air campaign – a contribution that surprised the international community. With the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Norway has lost its strategic relevance to NATO. Consequently, 
the Defence has gone through major changes, and the gradual shift of focus from territorial 
defence to participation in international operations is evident.  
The decision to deploy armed forces is one of the most important ones taken in all 
political systems. What is the rationale for Norway’s participation? Which factors were 
decisive in determining the specific Norwegian contributions? And, is there a growing 
tendency that Norway, i.e. politicians, military personnel and the public opinion, is becoming 
more accustomed to Norwegian armed forces participating in sharp missions far away from 
Norwegian borders? 
1.1 Research questions  
International military operations are complex and involve many different actors and phases. 
The present thesis does not aim to give an account of and discuss each operation, but to focus 
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on the political decisions made prior. Accordingly, two main questions will be addressed in 
the analysis: 1) Why did Norway decide to join (or not join) the operation, and 2) Why did 
Norway contribute in the way it did? These questions are closely related. However, it is useful 
to distinguish between the two as better to clarify the rationale for participation, and divide 
between politics and policy. A central point of departure of the thesis is that the analysis needs 
to include both international and domestic factors for the purpose of fully understanding the 
decision of participation, and the specific contributions provided in each operation.  
The Norwegian Government will be central in the analysis as the main actor that is 
represented both on the international, and the domestic arena. With the first question, I seek to 
investigate how much leeway the Norwegian Government has in its foreign policy when 
facing international expectations and domestic demands. In terms of the second question, it is 
a recurring problem within NATO that the member states have different rules of engagement 
(ROEs) for their national forces in the operations they partake in (Saideman & Auerswald 
2011). ROEs can be defined as internal instructions concerning when, where and how to use 
force (Dahl 2008, p. 397). Restrictions a state poses in addition to the ROEs of the mission, is 
in the analysis defined as ‘national caveats’. While some states are more liberal regarding the 
latter, others are more restrictive, which in the next round may hinder cooperation between 
the different national forces (Morelli & Belkin 2009). Hence, it is interesting to investigate 
which factors are decisive in the question of contributions, as states have different conditions 
for the use of its forces. This is supported by Frost-Nielsen (2011), who points out that 
military participation in an international operation is not only a question of whether or not to 
participate; it also concerns the conditions of the participation. 
1.2 Previous research 
1.2.1 Norway’s security and defence policy 
The end of the Cold War and the subsequently changed geopolitical context is a recurring 
theme in recent studies on Norwegian security and defence policy. Considering the topic of 
the present thesis, this section seeks to identify the main foci of relevant literature
1
.  
Numerous studies highlight the evident dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik in 
Norwegian foreign policy
2
 (Østerud 2006; Toje 2010; Harviken & Skjælsbæk 2010; Haug 
2012). Neumann (2012) points out that a central premise in the debate on Norwegian foreign 
policy has been that realpolitik opposes idealpolitik. However, in a more complex and 
                                                 
1
 Note that the present subdivision of the literature involves closely related issues, and that they are not mutually 
exclusive. 
2
 This will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 3. 
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unpredictable international situation, it is argued that idealpolitik, as a combination of self-
interest and altruism, has become more integrated in Norway’s foreign policy as to stabilise 
the present world order (Berger 2006; Knutsen 2007; Skånland 2009; Svenbalrud 2012). 
Espenes and Haug (2012) argue that Norway will be more willing to participate in 
international operations when it can be justified in terms of both idealpolitik and realpolitik. 
With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat against Norway’s security dissolved. A 
large body of the literature investigates the significance of the changed security climate, and 
how Norway is adjusting its security and defence policy to the new threat image. The main 
argument is that the diffused perceptions of threats and the lost strategic relevance in NATO 
have formed a need for change in the policy. Consequently, the Norwegian Defence has 
changed from having a territorial focus, to pursuing niche capabilities and moveable forces, 
along with participation in international missions (Matlary & Østerud 2005; Græger & Leira 
2005; Haaland 2007; Rottem 2007; Heier 2011). 
Another subject is the domestic power distribution between central actors in Norwegian 
foreign policy. It is argued that the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is increasingly 
challenged, and that the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s office are becoming 
more involved in security issues (Græger & Neumann 2006; Udgaard 2006; Græger 2010). 
Nustad and Thune (2003) argue that the political consensus and the lack of debate on 
deploying military personnel abroad, indicates that the balance of power between parliament 
and the executive is unlikely to change. However, Matlary and Halvorsen (2006) point out 
that the line between foreign and domestic policy has become more blurry, and argue that 
political parties have a new window of influence in foreign policy issues. 
Lastly, other authors address more specifically the use of force in international operations, 
and discuss the relationship between military power and the policy through which it functions. 
The main observation is that Norway contributes militarily for political influence and political 
effect (Fossum 2000; Rottem 2005; Toje 2012). With the case of Libya, Henriksen (2013a) 
challenges the conventional domestic view of the use of force, where the rationale for 
participation is for political effect, and argues that this should change to a focus on the 
military results the contributions may generate. 
1.2.2 Military alliances 
A common feature of most of the abovementioned studies is NATO – the cornerstone of 
Norwegian security and defence policy since Norway’s accession in 1949. It is emphasised 
that participation in an alliance entails obligations that limits the leeway of action and political 
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independency (Fermann 2007, p. 44). Hence, it is necessary to consider, in the present 
analysis, how NATO membership affects Norway in the question of using military force. 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on military alliances. Many 
scholars address several aspects of alliances in their studies, and it is not always easy to place 
the different works in distinctive categories. Nonetheless, four broad subjects in the literature 
can be identified. These are alliance formation; alliance configuration; the effects of alliances 
on military conflict; and the economics of alliances.  
Works on alliance formation concern why states choose to ally. A dominating part of this 
literature has a realpolitik perspective and stresses the importance of power in the pursuit of 
security, and as a motivation to commit to an alliance. It is underlined that the primary interest 
of states is to survive and to maintain security against attack (Morgenthau 1967; Liska 1968; 
Altfeld 1984; Walt 1987; Christensen & Snyder 1990). It is, however, suggested that shared 
values, preferences and institutions may play a role in alliance formation (Russett 1968; 
Siverson & Emmons 1991).  
The second category examines alliance configuration. The focus lies on the different 
types of military alliances, and investigates alliance characteristics such as background and 
formation, integration, duration and termination (Singer & Small 1966; Russett 1971; Walt 
1997; Snyder 1997; Leeds et al. 2002). Tertrais (2004) differentiates between formal 
alliances, informal alliances, and strategic partnership. He furthermore questions the use of 
alliance as a strategic concept, observing that trends from Afghanistan and Iraq confirm the 
growing tendency of ad hoc and bilateral alliances, over permanent and multilateral alliances. 
This point applies to the present analysis, as the case studies involve a mixture of NATO 
members and non-NATO countries. Hence, which factors can explain why some allies 
participate, while others abstain? 
A third category investigates the effects of alliances on war, and to which extent alliances 
prevent or provoke military conflicts. Some studies suggest that alliances raise threat 
perceptions and hostility levels, and thus provoke rather than prevent war (Levy 1981; 
Vasquez 1993). A good example for this argument is the tension between the Triple Entente 
and the Triple Alliance on the eve of World War I (WWI), where the increasing rigidity of the 
alliance systems is argued to have been a contributing factor for the break out of the war (Nye 
2009). Others find that alliances can both encourage and prevent military conflict, depending 
on the attributes of the alliance in question (Singer & Small 1968; Siverson & King 1980; 
Snyder 1984; Gibler 2000). Is Norway’s participation in international military operations after 
the Cold War thus a consequence of its NATO membership? 
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The fourth, and last category, concerns the economics of alliances. This category refers to 
the collective-goods theory of alliances, in which the security provided by an alliance is 
viewed as a public good. In this aspect the issue of burden-sharing is central. In the case of 
NATO, this has been a recurring theme since its foundation (see Hartley & Sandler 1999; 
Lindley-French 2007). Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) argue that larger powers contribute more 
to an alliance than the smaller powers, which gives the latter an incentive to free-ride on the 
former. The argumentation builds on the premise that once goods are provided, they are 
available to everyone. Drawing on the work by Olson and Zeckhauser, Conybeare, Murdoch 
and Sandler (1994) argue that the deterrence offered by an alliance is not only a purely public 
good, but that the defence activity can lead to country-specific benefits. Following a joint 
product model, it is indicated that the incentive for free-riding is curbed, as it opens up for an 
ally to spend more on defence so as to secure more private benefits which can only come from 
its own spending (Conybeare 1994; Sandler & Hartley 2001). Considering Norway’s argued 
loss of importance in NATO, the changes in the Norwegian Defence after the Cold War could 
be explained as efforts to secure private benefits (i.e. allied interest in coming to Norway’s 
aid), by proving Norway’s relevance to the Alliance. 
1.3 Justification of the study 
The present thesis is justified on three grounds. The first concerns the case of Norway. Much 
is written on the different operations, naturally with the exception of the fairly recent 
operation in Libya, though only a few scholars address the more general aspects of Norway’s 
participation in international military operations (Rottem 2007; Haaland 2007). Evaluating 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, Espenes and Haug (2012) provide an historical perspective, 
arguing that Norway has become more accustomed to the use of force. By going deeper into 
the topic and addressing the cases, including Iraq, systematically in a theoretical perspective, 
the present thesis can provide further insight into whether Libya is an exception to the rule, or 
if there has been a change in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices. 
Secondly, the present thesis is interesting as it seeks to address the literature gap on 
alliances. To a broad extent, the literature looks at alliances in general, and does not explain 
why states might provide diverging levels of support. One observer has already drawn 
attention to this point; Auerswald notes that the writings on burden-sharing come closest in 
explaining the diverging levels, but do so by documenting inequalities in peacetime defence 
spending among NATO allies (2004, p. 632). NATO has been involved in all of the four case 
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studies in the present thesis. By examining Norway’s room for action in NATO, the analysis 
can further the understanding of state behaviour in military alliances. 
Lastly, the thesis is justified with regards to theory. The theoretical approaches most 
often used to explain a state’s foreign policy are based on structural explanations, where the 
decisive factor is the anarchic conditions of the international system. Such an approach 
overlooks the influence of domestic factors, which I argue is important to consider when 
analysing low-intensity conflicts; since state survival is not at risk, there is arguably more 
room for manoeuvre in international relations. Studies that go beyond the state as a ‘black 
box’ are fewer and more studies are needed. By using a theoretical approach which includes 
both domestic and international factors, the study can provide insight into how the Norwegian 
Government faces pressure from both levels in its foreign policy. 
1.4 Approach and sources 
The present thesis will be a qualitative study based on a broad approach, in which the 
empirical framework includes four cases: the international military operations in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. By including all four operations, the examination of a possible 
development in Norway’s participation is strengthened. Although Norway did not participate 
in the intervention in Iraq, this case is just as interesting as it can shed light on reasons and 
possibilities for not participating. Norway has in the other cases provided different types of 
contributions, from humanitarian aid to armed forces. However, the prime focus of the 
analysis lies on the main military contribution. 
The theoretical framework applied to the analysis is the two-level games, which addresses 
the international and the domestic arena. Regarding the former, the analysis needs to address 
the broader context of each operation and the international negotiation environment. NATO 
will be central in the analysis, both as a forum and as an actor. Moreover, the member states 
often initiate dialogue outside the framework of NATO. In this regard, the US is an important 
actor as the major power in the Alliance, and also considering the value Norway puts on the 
special relationship the two states have
3
.  
At the domestic level the analysis needs to clarify the institutional structure and the 
distribution of power between central actors in Norwegian security and defence policy. This 
includes an examination of preferences and views of the Government, the Parliament, the 
media
4
, and the public opinion. There have been several changes of government during the 
                                                 
3
 See chapter 3 for further elaboration. 
4
 The present analysis does not aim to distinguish among the newspapers, as they have become more moderate 
ideologically. 
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period in question, i.e. from Kosovo in 1999 to Libya in 2011
5
. The specific party 
constellation of each Government will be important to take into account, as well as that of 
central actors, i.e. the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister.  
The analysis is based on a variety of sources in order to strengthen the interpretation of 
the findings
6
. The objective is to examine the decision-making process and the domestic 
negotiations on participation. The broad scope of sources supports the aim of moving beyond 
rhetoric used to the factual rationale of the decisions made. Dealing with security issues limits 
the access to primary sources as much information is sensitive and thus classified. In addition, 
the analysis involves recent cases, which makes it even more difficult to get insight into 
primary sources. The formal contact between the Norwegian Government and the Parliament 
goes through the Enlarged Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence (DUUFK)
7
. The 
negotiations are secret, and the minutes from the meetings are first made public after 30 years. 
An examination of parliamentary proceedings has therefore been essential, as they indicate 
the position of the Parliament and the Government regarding the issues in question. In 
addition, official Government documents and statements have been used to examine the 
position of the Norwegian Government. UN documents and the NATO handbook have been 
important for the purpose of examining international responses and the framework of NATO. 
A thorough investigation of the views on Norway of the other allies is not viewed as feasible 
for the scope of the present thesis. It is, however, believed that the perception and statements 
of the Norwegian Government on NATO negotiations will be sufficient for the analysis. 
With the limited access to primary sources, the analysis is to a large degree supplemented 
by media sources. Although media is a secondary source, and thus gives an additional 
interpretation, it indicates attitudes of central actors and dilemmas that were present. It is also 
a good source for examining the public sentiment. Considering the broad aim of the thesis, to 
investigate whether there has been a development in Norwegian use of force, academic 
literature has provided insight into the premises for Norwegian security and defence policy 
and additional perspectives on the subject. 
Additionally, the analysis is based on information acquired through four interviews
8
. The 
interviews were conducted with Sigurd Frisvold, Sverre Diesen, Morten Høglund and Dag 
Henriksen. Sigurd Frisvold was Norwegian Chief of Defence from 1999 to 2005, succeeded 
by Sverre Diesen in 2005, who had the position until 2009. Having held the highest position 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix A for an overview of the Norwegian Governments from 1997 to the present. 
6
 All the citations in the present thesis from Norwegian sources are translated to English by the author. 
7
 The Committee of Foreign Affairs (DUUK) and the Committee of Defence was in 2009 merged into DUUFK. 
8
 See Appendix B for interview guide 
8 
 
of the Norwegian Defence Establishment, they have been able to provide highly relevant 
information to the thesis. Moreover, they cover a large part of the period examined in the 
analysis, and have as such given insight into the question of a development in Norwegian 
participation. Morten Høglund is a parliamentarian from the Progress Party, who has been a 
member in DUUK/DUUFK since 2001 until present. Covering almost the entire period in 
question, Høglund is a central source from the Parliament, who has provided insight into the 
political aspect of Norway’s participation in international operations. Høglund’s party 
affiliation may affect the information. However, considering the political consensus that 
characterises Norwegian security policy, he is believed to provide information that to a large 
extent reflects the Parliament’s point of view. Dag Henriksen is interviewed first and foremost 
as a scholar. I have chosen to interview Henriksen as he has done research on several of the 
conflicts examined in the thesis, and he has in the interview been able to provide useful 
insight to aspects important to the analysis. Despite the restricted access to primary sources, 
the broad scope of sources is believed to provide the analysis with the essential information 
needed to answer the research questions. 
1.5 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical dimensions of the 
research, and looks at how domestic factors can influence a state’s foreign policy. Lastly, it 
presents the two-level games of Putnam (1988), as the theoretical framework of the analysis. 
Chapter 3 provides a basis for the analysis, with the purpose of getting a clearer understanding 
of distinctive features of Norwegian security and defence policy. Central in the thesis is the 
dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik, which will be assessed accordingly in the two first 
sections. The third section outlines the institutional framework for Norway’s foreign policy, 
followed by a brief account of NATO. Chapter 4 examines the four cases of the thesis. The 
argument presented is that Norway’s participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya can to a 
great extent be explained by international factors. However, one needs to address the domestic 
level to find a plausible explanation to the level of contributions and the Norwegian response 
in the case of Iraq. Chapter 5 brings the analysis one step further by applying the two-level 
games to the empirics. The main argument is that there has been a development in Norway’s 
participation in international military operations, from a ‘dovish’ attitude towards the use of 
force in Kosovo, to a more ‘hawkish’ and forward leaning attitude in Libya. Chapter 6 sums 
up the empirical analysis, followed by two general reflections into the development of 
Norwegian use of force internationally, grounded in Norway’s realpolitik and idealpolitik.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter evaluates the theoretical framework of the analysis. The purpose of theory is that 
it provides us with the means to go beyond mere descriptions and enables us to explain why 
events happen, and to understand continuities as well as changes (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 7; Nye 
2009, p. 9). To strengthen the analysis, a theoretical framework will therefore be used in order 
to frame the empirics in a larger context, and to support the investigation of a possible 
development in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices. 
The first part of the chapter considers neo-realism and its main tenets, and the neo-realist 
account of NATO. The value of neo-realism for the broad picture of international relations is 
acknowledged. However, a central premise in the present thesis is that the case studies in 
question concern low-intensity conflicts, as they do not present an imminent threat to Norway 
and its allies; arguably the leeway in foreign policy actions of the Governments is greater, 
compared to situations in which state security is threatened. Hence, I argue that the unitary 
actor approach of neo-realism does not provide a sufficient framework for the analysis. More 
focus on domestic politics is needed, and part two presents the two-level games of Putnam 
(1988) which will be the theoretical framework applied to the empirics. 
2.1 Neo-realism: a systemic theory of international politics 
Neo-realism is a systemic theory that provides theoretical explanations to the ‘big questions’ 
in international politics, such as the causes of war, the use of force and the conditions of 
peace. According to neo-realists, it is a state’s position in the international system that 
determines its national interests and predicts its foreign policies (Hyde-Price 2007). They 
further argue that because changes in the principal units (i.e. states) do not match the 
similarity in outcomes, unit-level variation is irrelevant in explaining international politics. 
The importance of structure-level effects is emphasised in the aim of explaining and 
understanding the continuities of international outcomes (Waltz 1979)
9
. Security policy is 
viewed as the primary concern of states, as international politics is played out in a self-help 
system in which states’ survival is at risk. 
Power (defined by capabilities) gives a state a place or position in the international 
system, which in turn defines the structure of the system and furthermore shapes the 
behaviour of states. In explaining the latter, the balance of power theory is central in neo-
                                                 
9
 Neo-realist writing can be divided into offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism argues that systemic 
factors are always the dominant factor, while defensive realism states that systemic factors drive some kinds of 
state behaviour but not others (see e.g. Rose 1998, p. 146; Hyde-Price 2007). The present account of neo-realism 
draws primarily on defensive realism. 
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realism. Waltz (1979) stresses that the theory does not predict uniformity or the necessity of 
states resorting to this behaviour, but it rather predicts the tendency of states resolving to this 
behaviour when it needs to. In the anarchic international system, states are concerned about 
their position relative to their main rivals and potential enemies. However, since weaker states 
have limited capabilities, they need to rely on the capabilities of allies (Waltz 1979, p. 168). 
This is exemplified by Norway and the German invasion in 1940, which revealed Norway’s 
limited capabilities. Consequently, it tied itself to NATO after the war, which provided a 
security guarantee.  
On the subject of alliance formation, neo-realism provides a strong explanation for the 
incentives to join NATO. At the time of its founding, WWII had just ended, and the Soviet 
Union and the US emerged as the two major powers in the international system. In efforts to 
provide for their own security, the Western European states had an interest in keeping an 
American presence on the continent. For the US, the involvement in Europe centred on 
strategic balance against the Soviet Union. Hence, the bipolar structure provided structural 
preconditions which opened up for an institutionalisation of US and West European security 
cooperation (Hyde-Price 2007).  
During the Cold War, no military operations were carried out by NATO. Following neo-
realism, the bipolar structure of this era provided predictability due to the simplification of 
calculations, and the fear of retaliation between the two power blocks (Waltz 1979, p. 118). 
Hence, the chief objective was effective war-prevention, not war-fighting capabilities (Yost 
2007, p. 47). With the demise of the Soviet Union the distribution of capabilities changed, and 
the US became a unipolar power. Consequently, the future of NATO soon became a focal 
point for theorists of international relations, and many realists predicted its demise in the new 
geopolitical environment (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993, 2000). The Alliance is still 
operational, however, and is not likely to be dissolved in the near future. Indeed, it has been 
more active now than during the Cold War. Arguably, a more nuanced theoretical approach 
than neo-realism is needed in explaining the international operations undertaken by NATO 
post-1990. 
2.2 Domestic factors in international politics 
Domestic politics, foreign policy, and international politics are inextricably 
linked. We cannot make sense of international relations without considering all 
three (Bueno de Mesquita 2006, p. xviii). 
Bueno de Mesquita challenges the traditional view of the state as a ‘black box’ – indicating 
that a structural approach is not sufficient in order to explain international relations. 
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Numerous authors have argued that there is an influence of domestic politics in international 
relations, which should be taken into account to fully understand the behaviour of states in the 
international system (Allison 1969; Putnam 1988; Milner 1992; Moravcsik 1997; Allison & 
Zelikow 1999; Carlsnaes 2008). One reason for the recent attention to the links between 
domestic and international politics is the end of the Cold War, and the perception by many 
that domestic politics now play an increasingly important part in foreign policy matters (Pahre 
& Papayoanou 1997). This is the basic assumption of the present analysis. 
In neo-realist eyes, national interest are relatively clear, as politics first and foremost are a 
question of self-interest and survival, not moral, rights and duties. The liberal approach of 
Moravcsik (1997, 2010), an author drawing on the work by Robert Putnam, is less focused on 
power struggle and gives more attention to domestic politics. Moravcsik stresses that it is the 
social pressure, transmitted through domestic political institutions, that defines state 
preferences and motivates its foreign policy. He continues by arguing that each state seeks to 
realise distinct interests under constraints imposed by the different interests of other states 
(Moravcsik 2010). Subsequently, this indicates a study of both domestic and international 
factors in addressing states’ foreign policy. 
With regards to NATO, studies on alliance behaviour post-Cold War indicate that it is the 
mix of structural incentives and constraints, and domestic concerns and attitudes, that can 
explain the relative autonomy of NATO members (Brawley & Martin 2000; Auerswald 
2004). In contrast to the Cold War era and the overarching Soviet threat, there is more 
uncertainty connected to the new security climate and what constitutes a threat to state 
security. In terms of countries that do not face an imminent security threat, it is indicated that 
there is greater leeway to use decisions in the security policy for other purposes than the 
protection against armed attacks on state territory (Skogan 2007, p. 138). States can thus 
direct its security policy towards other, though related, aims (e.g. reputation or normative 
perceptions). Consequently there will often be rivalry on what represents ‘state interest’, in 
which political differences, governance, and organisational conditions affect how national 
interests are formed internally and executed externally (Østerud 2007, p. 92). 
2.2.1 Two-level games: a theory of international bargaining 
Robert Putnam’s two-level games is a theory of international bargaining. It analyses how and 
when domestic and international politics interact, emphasising that processes at one level may 
affect the other. Putnam (1988) argues that the second image (domestic causes and 
international effects) and second image reversed (international causes and domestic effects) 
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are processes that need to be accounted for simultaneously, as central decision-makers strive 
to reconcile domestic and international imperatives at one and the same time. 
Using a metaphor of two tables, the international table (Level I) constitute the negotiation 
phase where key players negotiate a tentative agreement. The domestic table (Level II) 
involves a ratification phase, including separate discussions within each group of domestic 
constituents on whether or not to ratify the agreement (Putnam 1988, p. 436). Although 
Putnam divides the process of negotiation into two stages, this is for expository purposes and 
he emphasises that in practice games on the respective levels can occur simultaneously, where 
“expectational  effects will be quite important” (Putnam 1988, p. 436). 
The national political leader appearing at both tables, Level I and Level II, is termed the 
‘chief negotiator’. At the international table the chief negotiator, accompanied by diplomats 
and international advisers, faces his or hers foreign counterparts. The domestic table involves 
party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key 
interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisers. The chief negotiator in the present 
analysis is the Norwegian Cabinet. 
Facing both domestic and international pressures, the autonomy and bargaining power of 
the chief negotiator is constrained by what Putnam terms the ‘win-set’. The win-set is defined 
as the set of Level I agreements that would pass through domestic ratification (Putnam 1988, 
p. 437). It is determined by Level II preferences and coalitions, Level II institutions, and 
lastly, the chief negotiator’s strategies. Accordingly, the win-set concerns the actors’ political 
influence and assessment of the relative costs and benefits of negotiated alternatives to the 
status quo (i.e. no agreement). The greater the autonomy of the chief negotiator, the larger the 
win-set will be. However, the larger perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be 
‘pushed’ around by other Level I negotiators, while a small domestic win-set can be a 
bargaining advantage (Putnam 1988, p. 440).  
Stressing that the two phases are intertwined and simultaneous, the model takes 
considerations of domestic factors influencing international bargaining, and that international 
factors may reverberate in domestic politics, thus altering domestic perceptions and 
preferences. Situated at both tables, the chief negotiator seeks to maximise the ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures and at the same time minimise the adverse consequences of foreign 
development (Putnam 1988, p. 434). Consequently, statesmen in this predicament face both 
distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas (Putnam 1988, p. 459). In this 
regard, Putnam underlines the importance of the strategies of the chief negotiator, as a two-
level game is viewed as costly and risky for statesmen in this position (1988, p. 456). Putnam 
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outlines three motives of the chief negotiator: 1) Enhance his standing in the Level II game by 
increasing his political resources or by minimising potential losses; 2) shift the balance of 
power at Level II in favour of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons; 3) 
pursue own conception of the national interest in the international context (1988, p. 457). 
Following his or her preferences it may be in the interest of the chief negotiator to expand 
the win-set by using side payments in order to facilitate an agreement. Side payments can 
come from unrelated domestic sources, or they may be received as part of the international 
negotiation (Putnam 1988, p. 450). In this scenario, ROEs and national caveats can be a useful 
tool for decision-makers seeking to form their win-set in the question of deploying armed 
forces in international operations (Frost-Nielsen 2013). The set of arrangements preferred by 
the chief negotiator can be termed ‘acceptability-set’. Furthermore, cases with coalition 
governments, and accordingly possible different views on the perception of ‘national 
interests’, preclude an overlap of government officials acceptability-sets10 (Putnam 1988, p. 
438). With the exclusive power to negotiate internationally, the chief negotiator also has a 
veto over possible agreements. As Putnam points out: “Even if a proposed deal lies within his 
[the chief negotiator’s] Level II win-set, that deal is unlikely to be struck if he opposes it” 
(Putnam 1988, p. 457). 
When it comes to the size of the win-set and ratification procedures (dependent on the 
institutional setting), even small groups can have an effective veto power (Putnam 1988, p. 
448). We can speak of domestic veto players not just in formal ratification, but also in 
informal ratification. In the latter case, domestic veto players are those actors who have no 
formal say in a decision but whose support is critical for a government’s political survival 
(Mo 1995; Bosold & Oppermann 2006, p. 7). Consequently, involuntary defection may occur, 
which reflects the behaviour of the chief negotiator’s inability to deliver on a promise due to 
failed ratification, as opposed to voluntary defection which refers to intentionally failing to 
carry out a promise or commitment (Putnam 1988, p. 438). In the present analysis the 
ratification phase is informal as national security issues are viewed as a prerogative to the 
Norwegian Government
11
. However, being a liberal democracy, the Norwegian Government 
is always subject to votes of confidence (Mingst 2003, p. 66). The ratification as such thus 
stems from the Cabinet being accountable to the Parliament and the electorate. Moreover, 
when the electorate’s power to ratify an agreement is indirect, Trumbore (1998) emphasises 
                                                 
10
 Note that all Norwegian governments after the Cold War, apart from the Stoltenberg I minority Government, 
have been coalition governments. 
11
 See chapter 3 for further elaboration. 
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that the possibility of public preferences acting as a constraint on decision-makers, depends 
on the intensity of the issue and if it is regarded as important enough in the public opinion. 
Finally, it is important to note the differentiation Putnam makes between homogenous 
and heterogeneous issues. The latter involve more complex games, in which there can be 
domestic opposition both from those who think the Level I agreement goes too far, and from 
those who think it does not go far enough (Putnam 1988, p. 443). On issues, where the 
interests of the Level II constituents are relatively homogeneous, the most significant cleavage 
is likely to be between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, depending on the constituencies’ willingness to 
risk a strike (Putnam 1988, p. 443). 
2.2.2 The relevance of two-level games 
Since Putnam’s initial article, the two-level-games approach has been applied to a range of 
studies (Lehman & McCoy 1992; Avery 1998; Hug & König 2002). In a follow-up project, 
different cases were addressed, involving security issues, economic disputes, and non-
Western countries. This, in an effort to address the arguably bias of Putnam’s initial work, as 
it only focused on economic issues negotiated by Western democracies (Evans et al. 1993). 
Through the different contributions, the project shows a better fit of the model for economic 
issues. Other studies on two-level games and security issues, however, find that the approach 
applies well to their analysis, strengthening the argument that an understanding of domestic 
factors and dilemmas of the chief negotiator are essential in foreign policy – also when 
security issues are concerned (Carment & James 1996; LeoGrande 1998; Bosold & 
Oppermann 2006; Oma 2011). 
In aspect of the present analysis, the NATO negotiations did not concern an imminent 
threat against one of the allies, but whether NATO was to intervene or not in conflicts outside 
alliance territory. As such it can be termed low-intensity conflict
12
. Moreover, NATO as an 
organisation reflects a high degree of transparency, as the force planning process requires the 
member states to provide each other with detailed information about their existing and 
planned force structures (Duffield 1992, p. 843). Taking this into account, I argue that the 
theoretical framework of two-level games is well suited for the purpose of explaining allied 
member behaviour, despite dealing with security issues. 
Meeting the criticism of the two-level-game approach being more a metaphor than a 
theory, Moravcsik emphasises that it is important to specify the preferences and constraints of 
                                                 
12
 Although Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was a response to the 9/11 attack on the US, this was 
not an attack in the traditional sense where foreign forces invaded the country. 
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the major actors – this through a specification of domestic politics, the international 
negotiation environment (international constraints), and the preferences of the chief 
negotiator, who in turn is constrained by the win-set (1993, p. 23). Putnam’s model has also 
been criticised for being too simplistic, and that the relationship between the negotiator’s 
domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more complex (Ilda 1993; Knopf 1993; 
Mo 1994). Concerning the win-set, national institutions and a specification of domestic 
politics are included in the model, but Putnam gives most attention to the third determinant of 
the win-set, namely the chief negotiator’s strategies. Taking the criticism into consideration, I 
will in the present analysis devote more attention to the other determinants than was done in 
Putnam’s initial article. It should be noted, however, that the prerogative the Norwegian 
Government has in foreign policy
13
, implicates that much attention nonetheless must be given 
to the preferences of the chief negotiator. 
The next chapter provides a basis for the present analysis by presenting a brief outline of 
the history of Norwegian security and defence policy. Taking the two-level-games model into 
account, the last section of chapter 3 is devoted to a more elaborate specification of domestic 
politics regarding security issues in Norway, and NATO as the institutional negotiation 
environment.  
                                                 
13
 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 for further elaboration. 
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3 The Norwegian security and defence policy 
In White Paper no. 15 (2008-9), the dichotomy of realpolitik and idealpolitik in Norway’s 
foreign policy is stated explicitly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Realpolitik is evident 
through the projections of national interests and especially through Norway’s membership in 
NATO after WWII. Additionally, since Norway’s independence, idealism has been an 
important part of Norwegian foreign policy (Riste 2001) – reflecting the self-perception of 
Norway as a small state, seeking neutrality and peace. 
The two first sections of this chapter give a brief historical account of Norway’s security 
and defence policy. The first one addresses the realpolitik aspect with a special emphasis on 
NATO, while the second highlights Norway as a promoter of peace and the idealpolitik of its 
foreign policy. Then, the last section firstly reviews the institutional context and domestic 
politics in Norwegian foreign policy matters. Secondly, it addresses the framework of NATO. 
3.1 Realpolitik – securing national interests 
3.1.1 Policy of neutrality 
Norway’s foreign relations in the period from 1905 until WWI are classified as ‘classic 
neutralism’. The main aim of Norwegian foreign policy at the time was to keep out of great 
power politics and to secure Norway’s foreign trade and shipping interests (Fure 1996). 
Norway managed to maintain its neutrality during this period, but had at the time also 
amassed the fourth largest merchant navy in the world, and as such the country was dependent 
on external trade. Consequently, the policy of neutrality was challenged as Norway was 
caught between its trade relations with Britain and Germany. Not formally written but through 
meetings ‘off the record’ and tacit assumptions (not without extensive British pressure), 
Norway implicitly became Britain’s ‘neutral ally’ (Riste 2001, p. 95).  
In the inter-war period, Norway joined the League of Nations in 1920, a decision which 
was massively supported by the Parliament (Fure 1996, p. 184). The League of Nations and 
the prospects of a society emphasising international law and collective security, was viewed 
as beneficial in the eyes of the Norwegians – seeing that it could curb the incentives for great 
power politics and wars (see Haug 2012). However, the evident inability of the organisation 
becoming an effective instrument for collective security reinforced Norway’s traditional 
distrust in great power politics (Fure 1996, pp. 191-210). Hence, neutralism became Norway’s 
realpolitik. 
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3.1.2 Alliance integration and self-imposed restrictions 
The German invasion in 1940 proved to Norway that the policy of neutrality had its limits, 
and led to the perception that allies were needed to provide for its security (Eriksen & Pharo 
1997). The participation in power politics during WWII was generally viewed as a positive 
experience, and Norway aimed for a more active internationalism after the war (Riste 2001). 
It became an eager contributor to a strong United Nations and assumed the role as a bridge-
builder; an aspect of its foreign policy which will be addressed in section two. During the first 
years after 1945, Norway sought a Scandinavian alternative to ensure state security. However, 
due to the rapidly intensified Cold War, Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.  
NATO membership marked a shift in Norway’s foreign relations, as the country entered a 
peace time military cooperation based on solidarity and collective defence (Eriksen & Pharo 
1997)
14
. The decision of membership, however, did not come easily. In the parliamentary 
debates on Norway’s accession to NATO, the Communists and a few Labour Party politicians 
opposed a membership, emphasising friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the 
Norwegian foreign policy tradition of supporting the UN (Stortinget 1949b)
15
. It also met 
opposition among national conservatives, most strongly represented in the Farmer’s Party and 
the Conservative Party, aiming to prevent or limit the integration in the Alliance so as to 
reduce foreign influence (Eriksen & Pharo 1997, pp. 80-82). A Scandinavian defence league 
was not viewed as strong enough to solve the security problem, and the UN was doubted as an 
effective instrument for maintaining peace and security in the world (Stortinget 1949a). 
Hence, Norway’s geopolitically sensitive position generated a strong political consensus on 
the necessity of alliance membership (Græger 2005a, p. 221).   
Scholars of Norwegian foreign policy history picture a clear dualism in the Norwegian 
security and defence policy throughout the Cold War (Eriksen & Pharo 1997; Tamnes 1997). 
This dualism reflects the dilemma regarding NATO membership: on the one hand there was a 
fear of too much foreign influence and lack of national control, and most importantly the 
membership was perceived as a potential security threat as it could provoke the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, NATO was deemed essential to Norway’s security. However, despite the 
security guarantee, there was considerable concern about the Western willingness and ability 
to come to Norway’s aid. Already from 1949 it was clear to both Norwegian politicians and 
                                                 
14
 Note that there are those who argue for the opposite, emphasising that Norway implicitly has had security 
guarantee from the West since 1905, and thus the NATO membership does not represent a major shift in the 
Norwegian foreign and security policy (Riste 1991; Nyhamar 2007). 
15
 The proposition from the Special Foreign Affairs Committee on the accession of the Atlantic Treaty was 
amended with 130 votes against 13 (Stortinget 1949b). 
19 
 
military personnel that Central Europe was the main focus in the Alliance. Consequently, a 
proactive engagement was viewed as essential in order to convince allies of the importance of 
the Northern flank, and to promote Norwegian interests within NATO (Riste 2001, p. 211). 
The apparent diverging national interests were separately addressed through the ‘invitation 
policy’ and the ‘integration restriction policy’. 
With the invitation policy Norway put great efforts on keeping the great powers in NATO 
tightly bound to the Norwegian defence through cooperation and integration (Tamnes 1997, 
pp. 61-89). The establishment of the Northern Command in Norway in 1951 was in this 
regard important to the Government. Moreover, considering Norway’s weak military position 
in Europe, its defence capability needed to be strengthened in order to withstand an invasion 
until allies could mobilise and come to the rescue.  
The policy of integration restrictions was aimed at reassuring the Russians; restrict 
alliance presence in Norway; and to ensure national control of allied activity. The policy was 
expressed through several self-imposed restrictions: among them a policy of no foreign 
military bases, and no stationing of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in peace time; 
restrictions on allied training activities; and a demand for Norwegian control with intelligence 
collection and surveillance in the northern areas (Tamnes 1997, pp. 100-111). Furthermore, 
the policy was a political tool to cushion public opposition to NATO. It is important to note 
that the opposition to the established security policy was mainly concerned with the material 
content of the cooperation, as the membership itself was not contested (Tamnes 1997, p. 92). 
The US was of great importance to Norway both in terms of military aid to the 
modernisation of the Norwegian defence, and its ability to defend the country. The American 
interest in Norway grew strong quite quickly, especially regarding Norway as a platform for 
intelligence collection and surveillance (Riste 2001, p. 217). Although the US was annoyed 
with Norway on several occasions, the relationship was overall characterised as good and 
well-working. Following Tamnes, this special relationship justifies the term ‘an alliance 
within the alliance’ (1997, p. 61).  
Throughout the 1970s there was a period of détente and better dialogue between the East 
and the West. But, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the intensified arms 
race between the two super-powers, the Cold War heightened in the 1980s. The invasion of 
Afghanistan, another neighbouring country of the Soviet Union, sharpened Norwegian 
perceptions of the Soviet threat. The strengthened presence of US naval units and more forces 
designated for Norway in the 1980s were thus welcomed, and even encouraged by both the 
Norwegian Government and the public (Riste 2001, p. 226). Nonetheless, an arrangement in 
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January 1981 to pre-position heavy equipment in Northern Norway caused a clash between 
the invitation policy and the integration restriction policy – exemplifying the interaction of 
international and domestic factors in the negotiations of an agreement.  
The issue fuelled an intense political debate which went on throughout the decade. Critical 
voices, mainly from the labour movement, feared that the arrangement would tie Norway 
more strongly to the US’ global strategy and urged for a revision. Prime Minister Odvar 
Nordli, on the other hand, was convinced of the necessity of meeting allied requests and did 
not want to risk the cornerstone in Norwegian security policy. Hence, the main content of the 
arrangement was retained. In order to meet domestic concern the Nordli Government 
harmonised the initial arrangement with the integration restriction policy by changing the 
location from Northern to Central Norway (Tamnes 1997, pp. 108-111).  
3.1.3 From Cold War to international operations 
With the end of the Cold War a new geopolitical context emerged, and the US became a 
unipolar power. It was a particular game changer for NATO as its foremost enemy was no 
more. In Norway, however, a long-term uncertainty of how Russia would evolve remained. 
The Government continued its invitation policy in efforts to turn allied attention to the 
challenges in the north, but often to no avail. There was a reduction in allied forces earmarked 
to the defence of the Northern Flank, fewer allied exercises on Norwegian soil, and NATO’s 
command and control system was changed (Tamnes 1997, p. 141). 
While most Western countries adjusted their traditional priorities, doctrines and 
operational concepts, Norwegian armed forces were still concentrated in the north with anti-
invasion as their primary task (Græger 2005b). In the debates on the future role of NATO, 
Norway was among the countries not wishing for an expanded role for the Alliance 
(Willersrud 1999). Starting with the Gulf War in 1991, the Norwegian reluctance to go out of 
area was challenged (Børresen et al. 2004, pp. 189-92). Moreover, the participation in the 
conflicts during the 1990s and NATO reforms became catalysts in Norway, altering the 
political defence strategies, and starting a considerable downsizing and re-structuring of the 
defence establishment (Græger 2005b; Haaland 2007, p. 499). 
Concerning the increased number of international operations since the end of the 1980s, 
Børresen et al. (2004) point to four intertwined conditions that can explain the development: 
First of all the end of the Cold War and bipolarity led to several civil wars, and furthermore 
gave the UN an opportunity to take action with a Security Council that could unite on 
common grounds. Secondly, several organisations were now looking for new tasks that could 
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justify their existence. A third condition was a stronger moral imperative in the West to 
promote democracy and intervene when human rights were breached. Fourth and lastly, 
global terrorism materialised as one of the main threats to state security, and terrorism was 
placed high on states’ foreign and security agendas, especially after 9/11. 
White Paper no. 14 (1992-3) was the first since 1964 which systematically addressed the 
Norwegian engagement abroad (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 196). One of the aims presented was 
to secure an effective alliance, and to compensate for the diminishing strategic relevance of 
Norway through ‘troops for influence’ (Græger 2005a). The challenges of the new 
international climate were further addressed in the first strategic concept for the Norwegian 
Defence; an element standing out is that it opens up for intervention in international crises, 
though such intervention needs to be firmly anchored in international law and have a broad 
international support (Ministry of Defence 2004). The concept furthermore underlines the 
importance of NATO, the necessity of securing the Northern areas, and the need to contribute 
to peace, stability and further development of the international legal system – issues that can 
be identified as important in Norwegian security and defence policy since the end of WWII.  
As this section shows, there is a strong continuity in the basis and argumentation for 
Norway’s security and defence policy since 1949. However, the additional focus that is 
presented in the 2004 strategic concept and in my analysis in the following chapters indicates 
that there is a change in the method of promoting Norwegian interests. 
3.2 Idealpolitik – the Norwegian quest for peace 
As NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian security and defence policy, the UN and its efforts 
in contributing to a safer and more just world order became a cornerstone for Norwegian 
diplomacy in the post-war period (Tamnes 1997, p. 411). The idealpolitik is reflected in the 
perception of Norway as a peace nation, promoting democracy and human rights, based on 
size and tradition. The expressed moralism that can be noted in Norwegian foreign policy has 
deep roots in the Norwegian mentality. According to Leira (2005), a liberal peace discourse 
was established already in the period of 1890 to 1905, and became a foundation for the 
foreign policy at the time. A broad alliance between the Labour Party and left socialist parties 
with an emphasis on social democratic internationalism, and the centre parties with their 
bourgeois tradition of Christian values and moralism, ensured a central position of an active 
idealpolitik in Norway’s foreign relations (Fermann 1997, p. 208; Tamnes 1997, p. 344). 
With the new internationalism after WWII, peace-making was deemed a Norwegian 
speciality with the perception of Norway having a special role to play in leading the world 
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towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian values (Riste 2001, p. 225; 
Græger & Leira 2005, p. 48). In the cold international climate Norway sought a third way 
between the two superpowers, and assumed a bridge-building role between the East and the 
West. This was based on the perception that small powers have an advantage in international 
diplomacy due to absence of great power interests in conflicts. In this regard, Norway aimed 
at solving international disputes in the role as a mediator. The many efforts reached a high 
point with the Oslo Agreement of 1993, where it played an important part in the negotiations 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the 2002 ceasefire agreement for Sri Lanka. 
Although the Oslo Agreement did not lead to peace in the Middle East and the Sri Lanka civil 
war resumed, mediation has provided Norway access to important decision-makers (e.g. the 
US) and led to increased interest for Norwegian efforts (Skogan 2007, p. 153).   
Norway also became a critical voice in international politics. Without a history of 
colonisation, Norway remained critical of many of its allies in the decolonisation process, 
despite often meeting sharp reactions (Eriksen & Pharo 1997). It also criticised the 
authoritarian regimes of Greece, Spain and Portugal, opposed the US warfare in Vietnam, and 
became involved in the events in Latin America by supporting radical socialist movements. 
The critical line was not without costs, however. The involvement in Latin America, and 
especially the acknowledgement of North Vietnam in 1971 by the Bratteli Government, was 
not well received by the US (Tamnes 1997, pp. 356-357).  
As an ardent supporter of the UN and collective security, the political backing has been 
strengthened by a number of contributions to UN peace-keeping forces, in which the 
Scandinavian countries are among the largest contributors (Damrosch 2003, p. 53). The 
efforts and the willingness to provide monitoring troops while compromises are negotiated, 
reflect the political culture in Norway, which is grounded in the idea that conflict and violence 
can be prevented (Mingst 2003, p. 63).  
In the framework of the UN, Norway became a Western pioneer for development aid. In 
the efforts of promoting human rights and democracy, the development aid policy emerged in 
the late 1940s and was broadened throughout the 1960s. In the 1980s, however, it became 
evident that not all was evergreen concerning the Norwegian efforts. Many projects failed due 
to a lack of understanding of the local conditions and diverging goals. Moreover, the policy 
proved to by cost-ineffective and created an unhealthy dependency on development aid in the 
recipient countries (Tamnes 1997, pp. 404-5). The policy was revaluated during the 1980s and 
obtained a new direction; most notably there were now demands directed towards the 
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countries receiving aid, and Norwegian local businesses became more involved, reflecting 
motives of self-interests (Sørbø 1997). 
As the Cold War ended, the Norwegian international engagement blossomed. This can be 
explained by three factors: 1) the states faced new security threats; 2) triumphs like the Oslo 
Process and the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development of 1987 
strengthened the belief that Norway could make a difference; 3) Norway’s strong oil-based 
economy made it possible to finance the burdens that follow such engagement (Tamnes 1997 
pp. 443-4). The different elements were brought together in the 1990s in what is often termed 
‘engagement policy’ (Leira 2005, p. 152). Development aid and peace-building in conflict 
areas were highly prioritised and the ‘Norwegian model’ for peace work was formed, merging 
the efforts of voluntary organisations, research milieus, and the state (Tamnes 1997, p. 445). 
The involvement of the Norwegian society had increased dramatically from the 1980s, and 
together with the Government there was, and still is, a strong interest in promoting the policy 
(Tamnes 1997, p. 388). Moreover, there is a belief in the public that Norway can solve world 
problems, and the engagement policy is noted to have a remarkably strong support in the 
Norwegian population (Leira 2005, p. 135).  
The notion of Norway as a peace-nation is arguably a poor match with the increased 
military engagement outside Norwegian borders since the 1990s. The participation has been 
presented as a prolongation of the active peace policy. As such, the traditional peace policy 
and the military engagement were defended both in terms of being a good in itself, and as a 
contribution granting Norway access to important actors and significant political capital 
(Leira 2005, p. 153). This is further outlined in White Paper no. 15 (2008-9): 
Competence within development policy or international institutional 
development becomes useful in realpolitik, while military efforts can also have 
an important ideal political dimension. […] Traditional divisions between the 
‘soft’ idealpolitik and the ‘hard’ realpolitik are today less meaningful (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2009, pp. 20, 85). 
Accordingly, the Norwegian contributions to a world order based on international law also 
reflect realpolitik, as small powers benefit from a regulated international system (Nustad & 
Thune 2003, p. 172). It is argued that the strong Norwegian support for the UN to a great 
extent can be explained by that it is within the UN it has been possible for Norway to unite 
self-interest and ideal motives (Fermann 1997, p. 209; Nyhamar 2007 p. 150). Consequently, 
seeing the emphasis Norway places on the UN and the engagement policy, I argue that this 
puts pressure on Norway to continue this path faithfully and respond readily when the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) amends resolutions. 
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3.3 Domestic politics and the international negotiation environment 
3.3.1 Level II: Norway 
Foreign policy, therein security and defence policy, differs from other policy areas, as the 
Constitution gives the Norwegian Cabinet a prerogative in this regard. Under § 25 of the 
Norwegian Constitution, the king is the Commander-in-Chief, and as such has the authority to 
deploy military forces outside Norway. However, it is the Norwegian Cabinet that exercises 
the king’s authority, and in practice the prerogative of the king lies with the Cabinet. 
In terms of participation in international military operations, the Constitution § 25 
provides certain constraints: armed forces are not to be transferred to the service of foreign 
powers, and forces belonging to the territorial defence shall never be deployed abroad without 
the consent of the Parliament. Nevertheless, as stated in White Paper no. 14 (1992-3): “The 
provision is not meant to cut the king’s access to delegate authority of command to non-
Norwegian organs or persons, as it would prohibit any Norwegian participation in 
international missions” (Ministry of Defence 1993, p. 27). Furthermore, it is argued that the 
historical basis for these provisions needs to be taken into account in the interpretation
16
 
(Andenæs 1964). Accordingly, through new constitutional practice, the provisions have not 
been interpreted as a constraint on participation in a collective military operation
17
. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has the overall responsibility for managing 
national interests in NATO and other multilateral organisations, while the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) maintains and coordinates Norway’s political relations regarding defence. In 
the Cold War era the defence policy was viewed as subordinate to security policy. With the 
changed security climate, however, the MFA has had a loss of functions as the line between 
domestic and foreign policy is less clear (Græger & Neumann 2006). Moreover, there has 
been a shift in the delegation of power between the two ministries, as the MoD has become an 
important actor in the framing of security policy (Tamnes 1997, p. 65). The Prime Minister’s 
office is the final point of power exertion and the last organ in the government apparatus. It is 
argued to be large in power, both formal and informal, and to have an important role in regard 
to the other ministries – especially when the Prime Minister is engaged directly and takes 
personal initiative in single issues (Udgaard 2006, p. 48). 
The Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, has a consultative role when it comes to security 
and defence policy. It is not supposed to exercise constitutional control with the Government, 
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 The constraint on transferring and deploying armed forces were to prevent business with mercenaries, and to 
prevent the country from being rendered defenceless in the time of the union with Sweden. 
17
 Note that this has been criticised, see Nustad & Thune (2003) and Holmøyvik (2012). 
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but rather support its main course of foreign policy. This is drawn from the perception that 
disagreement is viewed as a strategic problem and thus a threat to Norway’s role in the world 
(Sjaastad 2006, p. 20). Consequently, there are no sharp political divisions regarding foreign 
policy matters in Norwegian politics. The political consensus on foreign policy issues is 
reflected in a tradition for a good and constructive dialogue between the subsequent 
governments and the opposition parties, in which the Storting has seldom found it necessary 
to challenge the Government; compared to major European democracies, Norwegian post-
WWII politics is argued to have stayed reasonably consensual (Heidar 2004, p. 58). 
The formal contact between the Government and the Storting goes through the Enlarged 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence (DUUFK)
18
. The Committee of Foreign Affairs 
(DUUK) and the Committee of Defence were merged into DUUFK in 2009 – underlining the 
unclear division between security and defence policy. Despite having a consultative role, it is 
noted that the Storting have a strong position in the framing of Norway’s foreign policy 
(Eriksen & Pharo 1997, p. 42). 
3.3.2 Level I: NATO 
NATO was founded on April 4
th
 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
Washington. Its creation was a reaction to Soviet expansionist policies and Western concern 
of Kremlin’s intent to maintain its military forces at full strength. Article 5 thus became a 
crucial premise, in which “the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (North Atlantic 
Treaty 1949). Article 5 and providing for the immediate defence and security of its member 
states is still defined as the Alliance’s core task (NATO 2006). Facing the new security 
climate post-1990, however, the main focus has been expanded to include non-Article 5 
missions, by which NATO has gone from being a territorial defence alliance to become a 
politico-military instrument with a global reach (see Lindley-French 2007). 
NATO is an intergovernmental organisation, as all decisions are taken on the basis of 
unanimity and consensus – a principle that is applied at every level of the organisation. As 
outlined by NATO: “Each member country participates fully in the decision-making process 
on the basis of equality, irrespective of its size or political, military and economic strength” 
(NATO 2006, p. 15). The most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC), which assembles representatives from all the member states at the level of 
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 The Committee is made up of members of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, the 
president and vice president of the parliament, the chairman of the Defence Committee and up to eleven 
members appointed by the Elections Committee.  
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ambassadors, ministers or heads of state and government. The Secretary General is the head 
of the NAC, and is always a European. The Military Committee constitutes the link between 
the political decision-making process within NATO and the integrated command structures. It 
is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, who is always an American. 
NATO’s first strategic concept from 1991 differs substantially from preceding documents. 
It combines the fundamental purpose of the Alliance with the obligation to work towards 
improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation 
with former adversaries (NATO 2006, p. 18). The concept was revised in 2002, committing 
the member states to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area to confront new 
threats and meet new challenges. The military command structure was reorganised, which 
facilitated a transformation of military capabilities adapted to the new commitments and tasks 
– “reflecting a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking” (NATO 2006, p. 21). 
After enforcing its first missions since the establishment in the events of the Yugoslav 
Wars in the 1990s, there has been an increased scope of military operations undertaken by 
NATO. The nature of the decision-making process in NATO allows for constructive 
abstention (i.e. political support without participation), and the operations have been 
undertaken through different coalitions within the Alliance, and with varying contributions 
from each member (if any at all). Moreover, the international operations have proposed little 
or no risk to own national territories and populations; the justification has been, as NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer expressed it: “Either we tackle these problems when 
and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep” (Scheffer 2004).  
The cooperation within NATO can be said to be well-working and the organisation has 
‘survived’ the demise predicted by scholars. Since its foundation there have been, however, 
heavy debates concerning burden-sharing, and with the later operations, especially in 
Afghanistan, the focus has shifted from resources to body bags (Saideman & Auerswald 
2011). Much of the debates are related to the European states’ dependency on the military 
power of the US and the evident capabilities-gap (Lindley-French 2007). On the subject of 
military operations undertaken by NATO, there is room for manoeuvre in the decision-
making process, but at the same time the alliance membership, based on solidarity, entails 
obligations and pressure to contribute, which in the next round limit the leeway of action. 
Moreover, there is the iterative nature of NATO, whereby states will consider its reputation in 
the alliance in the anticipation of the game being repeated (Eichenberg 1993, p. 73). With this 
chapter as a basis, the next chapter addresses the four cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Libya, by examining Norway’s decision of participation and the main military contributions.  
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4 From Operation Allied Force to Operation Unified Protector 
Compared to the rather modest contribution to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo 1999, the 
extensive Norwegian role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 indicates a significant 
development in a short period of time. The present chapter analyses Norway’s participation in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya accordingly. The aim of the first section in each case is 
shortly to assess the international issues of debate prior to the operations and the actions taken 
by the international community. The picture of each operation is complex with different 
coalitions, main actors, and organisations involved, but despite these variations, NATO has 
been central in each case, both as a forum and an actor, and is given attention. The second 
section of each case addresses the debates in Norway, examining firstly the argumentation for 
participation, and secondly the contributions. 
4.1 Kosovo: a humanitarian intervention 
Shortly after the end of the Cold War, conflicts broke out in the Balkans as several regions 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Despite US reluctance to get involved 
in the area, the escalating crisis and the failure of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers, drew the US 
and NATO into the conflicts (Sloan 2005).  
The leader of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, had in 1989 removed Kosovo’s former 
autonomy, with plans for the region to become a Serbian national project (Smith 2003, p. 98). 
Kosovo, mainly inhabited by ethnic Albanians, had at first attempted a more peaceful way to 
regain their independence. However, in the Dayton Accords of 1995, ending the Bosnian war, 
which broke out in 1992, there was no mentioning of Kosovo. Hence, the Kosovars realised 
that more forceful means were needed in order to get the attention from the international 
community (Henriksen 2007, p. 124). During 1998 there was an open conflict between the 
Serbian military forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo, which resulted in the 
deaths of 1.500 ethnic Albanians, and more than 400.000 were driven from their homes 
(Sloan 2005, p. 103).  
When NATO began Operation Allied Force (OAF) on March 24
th
 1999, it was after 
lengthy debates within the Alliance. The humanitarian crisis that evolved in the backyard of 
Western Europe was daily broadcasted in the media, and many voiced the need to take action. 
There was also fear within NATO for the security in the region as the situation could spiral to 
involve Albania and Macedonia (Smith 2003, p. 98). From the autumn of 1998, Milosevic 
faced a NATO ultimatum to either end his brutal offensive in Kosovo or to expect airstrikes. 
The threats, however, lost their credibility as NATO members were unable to agree on the 
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political objectives for Kosovo (Pharo 2000). Moreover, the disagreement concerned the lack 
of a UN mandate for an intervention
19
; the confrontation with Russia, which argued that the 
intervention breached international law; and the issue of deploying ground forces (Henriksen 
2007). The US was a constant driving force for using military means. President Clinton faced 
stiff domestic opposition, but managed to turn the Senate and Congress in favour of a military 
operation, and was in March able to take command of a NATO intervention (Thurmann-
Nielsen 1999; Sloan 2005). 
When the Rambouillet peace negotiations
20
 collapsed in March 1999, NATO consented to 
the necessity of air strikes. The discussions within the Alliance, however, continued almost up 
until the air campaign was authorised on March 23
rd
, after an emergency meeting in NAC 
(NTB 1999a). Some allies preferred to continue the diplomatic approach, but Washington 
eventually stated quite clearly that time for negotiations was over (Aftenposten 1999a). In 
order to maintain alliance unity, strong political control was imposed on the air campaign, 
which was to be executed through three phases with each phase to be approved by NAC 
(Henriksen 2007). 
The OAF lacked a clear UN mandate. The UNSC could not agree on a new resolution, as 
China and Russia made it clear that they would not support the use of force against Serbia 
(Sloan 2005, p. 109). Nevertheless, NATO justified the intervention by the need to stop the 
atrocities and to prevent a destabilisation of the region (Rottem 2007). This led to an 
international debate on the limits of the sovereignty principle, the international community’s 
obligations and rights, and the possibility for and limits of third parties’ ability to prevent 
wars and humanitarian crisis (Eide 2000)
21
. Kosovo outlined in many ways the difference 
between legality and legitimacy; legality presupposes a formal pertinence to international law 
(i.e. the UN Charter) and a resolution in the UNSC, while legitimacy concerns the moral 
imperative. Accordingly, NATO members judged the use of force as consistent with the 
purposes of the UN despite the lack of a UN mandate (Sloan 2005, p. 104). In other words, 
everything legal is legitimate, but issues which are perceived as legitimate, are not always 
legal.  
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 The UN Resolution 1199 was not explicit – it confirmed that the situation was serious and a potential threat to 
international peace and security (Pharo 2000, p. 11). 
20
 The proposed settlement called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, and the 
presence of a NATO stability force to supervise the situation (see Henriksen 2007, chapter 8). 
21
 Several contributions have been published on this topic; see Simma (1999); Schnabel & Thakur (2000); Ku & 
Jackobson (2003). 
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4.1.1 Norway’s difficult way to Kosovo 
The decision of the Bondevik I Government
22
 to participate in OAF, breached with previous 
policies as the intervention lacked a UN mandate – a legal justification, which until now had 
been an expressed precondition for Norway’s participation in international operations (Nustad 
& Thune 2003). The events in Bosnia were a pre-warning to Norway of the new security 
environment post-Cold War, and signalled the need to rethink the role of the Defence and its 
prevailing territorial focus (Espenes & Haug 2012). Still, Kosovo came rather as a shock, both 
militarily and politically. 
Norway sought for a long time a political solution to the crisis through diplomacy rather 
than through the use of military force – reflecting the Norwegian political culture as a small 
state and the emphasis on diplomacy and the belief in political solutions. The Norwegian 
efforts were furthermore strengthened by the set-up of temporary diplomatic stations in 
Albania and Macedonia in March 1999 (Bonde 1999). Moreover, in 1999 Norway had the 
chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), bringing 
the country right into the centre of the conflict as the OSCE had observers in the region. Knut 
Vollebæk (KrF), Norwegian Foreign Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, was 
engaged in several international meetings, seeking a political solution. The meetings with 
Slobodan Milosevic, however, ended in humiliation. According to sources directly involved 
in the negotiations, Milosevic clearly stated that he did not have respect for the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister and the OSCE Chairman, accusing him and the OSCE of running errands for 
the Americans (Lund 1999). These episodes underline Norway’s role as a small state and the 
lack of influence for the OSCE as an organisation
23
. 
With its strong emphasis on diplomacy, Norway was reluctant to an intervention, 
underlining a UN mandate as a condition for the use of force (Pharo 2000, p. 8). However, in 
March 1999, when it became clear that the negotiations would not lead to a political solution 
and NATO became more determined to use military force, this seems to have turned the 
Norwegian Government around. In the media, Vollebæk said that the starting point should be 
to avoid war, but then asked rhetorically whether one should refrain from taking action – 
stating that the use of force could be justified but that it has to be grounded in international 
law (Nymoen 1999). The shift in the Government’s attitude is confirmed in an official report 
on the Kosovo crisis by the MoD, emphasising that “in this situation NATO was the only 
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 A coalition government consisting of the Christian People’s Party (KrF), the Liberal Party (V) and the Centre 
Party (Sp) (see Appendix A).  
23
 For further elaboration see Galbreath (2007), who addresses the role of OSCE in European security policy. 
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alternative” (Ministry of Defence 2001, p. 4). The Government defended the NATO actions 
with formal juridical arguments based on the UN Charter, arguing that both the UNSC and the 
General Secretary, Kofi Annan, declared the situation to be severe for the population (NTB 
1999b; Pharo 2000)
24
. Nevertheless, the Norwegian hope for a diplomatic solution lingered as 
the OAF went on. While President Clinton urged for intensified action, Vollebæk urged for 
negotiations (Thomassen & Thurmann-Nielsen 1999).   
In the Storting there was remarkably little opposition. In the debate, which followed a 
report by Prime Minister Bondevik (KrF), the Storting unanimously authorised Norway’s 
participation (Stortinget 1999). Although the situation was termed a moral dilemma, the 
speakers in the debate emphasised the ‘principle of necessity’ and that international law 
should not get in the way of human rights. Even Sosialistisk Venstreparti
25
 (SV) – a party 
founded on opposition to NATO membership and usually critical to all use of force – 
supported an intervention. Erik Solheim (SV) stated that “we are accepting NATO bombing 
and NATO warfare in the Balkans only because the alternative to this is even worse” (cited in 
Stortinget 1999, p. 2529). The case suggests that also SV had to put realpolitik and the use of 
force before idealpolitik. 
A clear majority of the public opinion supported the intervention and the Norwegian 
participation (Mosveen et al. 1999; Børresen et al. 2004, p. 222). While tens of thousands 
demonstrated against NATO’s bombing in Europe and in the US (Aftenposten 1999c), the 
small demonstrations in Norway consisted of political parties and organisations from the far 
left political wing (Bergens Tidende 1999). Hence, this indicates that the Government’s 
decision to contribute met little opposition in the Norwegian population.  
There was expressed criticism to the bombing of Kosovo in editorials of the major 
Norwegian newspapers (NTB 1999c), but for the most part the media coverage gave neutral 
reports on events and on the parliamentary debates at the time. The Bondevik I Government, 
evaluating the Norwegian media coverage of Kosovo, perceived an all-party consensus 
concerning NATO, and that this consensus significantly eased the Government’s handling 
internally, both with regard to the Storting and to the public opinion (Ministry of Defence 
2001, p. 6). 
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 Note that the political and legal justification of Norwegian participation in international military operations has 
been questioned (see Pharo 2000; Nustad & Thune 2003), but that this discussion will not be addressed in the 
present thesis. 
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 The Socialist Left Party. 
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4.1.2 Badly prepared and lack of experience 
The Norwegian engagement in the Kosovo crisis consisted of different contributions by 
different actors, in which the most important was the contribution of ground- and air forces 
(Børresen et al. 2004, p. 223). The participation with air forces was historical as it was the 
first sharp mission for Norwegian fighter aircraft pilots since WWII.  
As the situation escalated in February 1999, it became probable that Norwegian special 
forces
26
 would get involved in the assistance of NATO in a possible evacuation of OSCE 
personnel (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 225). In the initial phase the Telemark Battalion turned out 
to be badly prepared as they were not sufficiently trained and lacked experience with sharp 
missions (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 227). Consequently, it used four months in the set-up of the 
unit with necessary personnel, materiel and education. The delay was allegedly commented 
by the British, who asked if the Norwegians had walked to the Balkans (Diesen 2013).  
In OAF Norway contributed with six F-16 fighter aircrafts. According to Foreign Minister 
Vollebæk the contribution was what NATO had requested, and that it was comparable to the 
contributions given by other small powers in the Alliance (Hansen & Austenå 1999). Their 
use, however, was constrained by the inability to operate at night time as the Norwegian 
fighter aircrafts’ system was not able to distinguish between enemy and allied fighter 
aircrafts; nor did they have air-to-ground capacity. Moreover, the deployment was also 
delayed due to large shortages in materiel, which raised eye-brows from other allies seeing 
that the squadron had been assigned to the Initial Reaction Force the previous year (Børresen 
et al. 2004, p. 224). 
Operational it was problematic that the squadron, to which the fighter aircrafts belonged, 
was organised for Article 5 missions, and as such not prepared for out-of-area operations 
(Børresen et al. 2004, p. 223). Furthermore, for the Norwegian personnel deployed, it was 
viewed as problematic that the political and military leadership did not, to a very large degree, 
publicly emphasise the significance and the gravity of the situation. The Government 
consistently sought to avoid the term ‘war’ and had a need to underline the concept of 
humanitarian intervention (NTB 1999b; Rottem 2007, p. 626). Seemingly it was 
uncomfortable in the new situation and with the use of force.  
It is interesting to note that prior to OAF there was internal disagreement between the 
ministries in Oslo. The MoD called for NATO to work out a report on alternative military 
options, therein the possibility for deploying ground forces; whereas, the MFA, while 
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 The Telemark Battalion, the special task force established in 1993, was already stationed in Macedonia as a 
part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force established on March 31
st
 1995. 
32 
 
consenting to the military evaluation by the MoD, stated that for political reasons it would be 
unwise for Norway to voice this in NATO, considering the political sensitivity of the issue 
and the cohesion of the Alliance. MFA’s point of view prevailed, concluding that Norway 
should not give the impression of being a driving force for such an option (Ministry of 
Defence 2001). In other words, although it was viewed as military strategically wise to 
consider ground forces, political reasons weighed more – indicating a subordination of the 
operation to NATO cohesion. Consequently, Norway remained opposed to deploying ground 
forces to OAF (Aftenposten 1999b; NTB 1999d).  
Underlining Norwegian reluctance to the use of force, Norway was among the forerunners 
to pose ROEs on the choice of bomb targets. This, however, proved difficult, and Norway 
struggled within NATO to get acceptance for such restrictions (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 221). 
It is noted that important choices, such as decisions taken on bomb targets, were made by the 
leaders of the US, Britain and France, which all demanded greater input to the operation 
(Henriksen 2007, p. 21). This implies that the preferences of little Norway was subordinate 
the interests of the greater powers. 
Overall, both the Norwegian politicians and the military seem to have been satisfied with 
the military contribution. Dag Henriksen is not aware of any broad coordinated push for a 
stronger military contribution from neither politicians nor the military establishment: “It was 
the first war in the history of NATO, it was the first use of Norwegian fighters in war since 
WWII, and without a clear UN mandate it appeared to be relative consensus regarding our 
politically visible but military limited contribution” (Henriksen 2013c). An interesting 
comparison is the Netherlands, who chose to speed up their technological development and 
was in short time able to provide modernised F-16s and KDC-10 tanker aircraft (Government 
of the Netherlands 2000). It would seem that there was a greater willingness to contribute 
more heavily to the operation in the Netherlands, despite being a small power. 
Norway’s double engagement of idealpolitik and realpolitik became evident in Kosovo. In 
the period between 1991 to 1998, the humanitarian aid to the Balkans reached 2.2 billion 
Norwegian kroner (NOK), while in 1999 alone one billion NOK was given in humanitarian 
aid and 0.8 billion NOK the year after (Børresen et al. 2004, p. 220). Both idealpolitik and 
realpolitik can furthermore be noted in the justification of the participation in Kosovo: on the 
one hand there was the humanitarian justification; on the other hand the engagement was 
defended as a way of securing Norwegian national interests and Norwegian society (Nustad & 
Thune 2003). However, the Norwegian reluctance considered, I argue that realpolitik and the 
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pressure following NATO membership was decisive for Norwegian participation in OAF. It 
seems that when push comes to shove, realpolitik prevails. 
4.2 Afghanistan: aiding an ally 
On September 11
th
 2001, the US was attacked by the terrorist network al-Qaida. As a 
response, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched on October 7
th
 2001 to eliminate 
al-Qaida, and to end the Taliban regime, perceived as providing a safe haven for terrorists 
(Conetta 2002; Bowman & Dale 2009). The character of terrorism implicates an enemy 
hiding within a state, and we are thus not speaking of traditional warfare. Consequently, the 
OEF ‘dragged’ the Taliban regime and Afghanistan into war. Nevertheless, there was a broad 
international agreement that the US had the provision for the attack on Afghanistan (UN 
Security Council 2001a). 
In the events of 9/11 Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO’s history, whereby 
all NATO members condemned the attack on the US. However, NATO officials emphasised 
that this was a political declaration and no military decision (Hellstrøm 2001). Several allies, 
among them France and Germany, were vary and warned against a hasty act of revenge after 
NATOs historical decision (Idås 2001a). The Alliance was thus waiting for Washington, 
stating that it would contribute to a military operation should the US ask for it, but that each 
NATO member state could decide whether it wanted to participate militarily or not (Idås 
2001b) – underlining the nature of NATO as an organisation. The US never asked for a joint 
action by the Alliance, and it was quite clear that it intended to go it alone – marking its 
unipolar position in the international system. Apart from a few, rather modest, requests, 
NATO was offered a very limited role with no command or control of the military operation. 
As the American and British troops succeeded in removing the Taliban regime, the UN 
called for a stability force to be stationed in Kabul before December 22
nd
 2001, the date of the 
entry of the Afghan interim government (Aftenposten 2001d). Accordingly, the International 
Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UNSC on December 20
th
 2001 (UN 
Security Council 2001b). The UK agreed to take the command of ISAF as no country 
immediately offered to do so (NTB-Reuters 2001).  
The option of NATO taking command was at this point not feasible as it had political and 
geographical restrictions on where it could and should engage itself. With the revised strategic 
concept from 2002 – which opened for NATO engagement in securing peace and stability in 
the wider Euro-Atlantic area – NATO took command of ISAF on August 11th 2003. That 
same year the UNSC expanded ISAF’s mandate, which until then was limited to the 
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boundaries of Kabul, opening for an expansion of the mission across the country. 
Consequently, NATO extended its area of responsibility to the north in December 2003, and 
west in February 2005. Furthermore, in July 2006, NATO assumed command of the southern 
region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, and in October 2006 NATO took 
responsibility for the entire country by taking command of the international military forces in 
eastern Afghanistan (ISAF n.d.). 
Many allies contributed troops on the premise that ISAF’s focus would be on post-conflict 
stability operations (Bowman & Dale 2009, p. 14). By late 2006, however, as violence 
escalated and ISAF extended its responsibilities, the allies began to realise that ISAF in reality 
was at war and that the mission would have to change (Morelli & Belkin 2009, p. 10). Since 
NATO assumed command of ISAF there has been a continuous challenge to get its members 
to address the need for resources in the south, and one of the key issues has been to overcome 
national caveats on the contributions (Saideman & Auerswald 2011). The cohesiveness of 
NATO is consequently under pressure as an increasing division is evident between those 
member states willing to accept more risk and those who do not (Raitasalo 2008, p. 99). 
Accordingly, it seems fair to presume that the pressure to contribute was extensive. Among 
the allies with many caveats is Norway, which for one thing has not permitted its troops to be 
deployed to anywhere else than the northern region
27
.  
4.2.1 Norway out of area 
When the US and the UK attacked Afghanistan on October 7
th
 2001, the intervention had 
broad political support in Norway. Although the Stoltenberg I Government
28
 was not 
informed of the attack, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) said that it was expected and that 
it in any case was an important political signal that Norway, as other NATO countries, was 
willing to contribute militarily (Rønning 2001). After the change of government in October 
2001, we see the same attitude in the Bondevik II Government
29
. The new Foreign Minister, 
Jan Petersen (H), expressed that there would not be a shift in the line of foreign policy, and 
that the bombing of Afghanistan was “the right thing to do” (cited in NTB 2001b). 
As Petersen was to meet his counterpart, Colin Powell, in the US in November, domestic 
pressure followed on the issue of cluster bombs. When it became known that the US used 
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 The Special Forces were among the first Norwegian forces to be deployed to Afghanistan in 2001. Until 
present they have been in Afghanistan for four periods, and are to be stationed in Kabul until the end of 2014, the 
year the ISAF operation is to be concluded (see Ministry of Defence 2013a). 
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 A minority government consisting of the Labour Party (see Appendix A). 
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 A coalition government consisting of the Christian People’s Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Party (see Appendix A). 
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such bombs in Afghanistan – weapons which Norway internationally sought to ban – 
Kristelig Folkeparti
30
 (KrF) and SV pressured Petersen to discuss the issue with the US. This 
was a promise he was not willing to give, arguing that “if I had presented this as the view of 
Norway, we would immediately have lost the attention of the Americans” (cited in Sønstelie 
2001). It was clearly more important to keep the good will of the US, rather than to abide the 
wishes of the political parties back home – including the government party KrF. 
Though political support was given to the US, no requests were initially directed to 
Norway, and the Norwegian Government had a rather passive attitude. Defence Minister 
Kristin Krohn Devold (H) stated that it was a possibility for Norway to contribute in many 
areas, but that one needed to wait and see what was being asked of it (Johnsen 2001). Later, in 
the Storting on December 5
th
 2001, Foreign Minister Petersen informed that Norway had been 
requested by Washington to provide military assistance to the UN’s humanitarian efforts. 
Moreover, US military authorities had notified the Norwegian Government of a request for 
direct military contributions to the OEF, to which it was set to respond quickly and positively 
(Petersen in Stortinget 2001). As Krohn Devold stated:  
[I]t is now about time to give the political declarations of support a real content. 
[…] In addition to our self-interest in participation in the fight against terrorism, 
it is most central for Norway to demonstrate that we have the ability and 
willingness to fulfil our collective defence obligations set out in the Atlantic 
Treaty Article 5, and the expectations that follows our long-term and long-lasting 
security policy cooperation with the US (Stortinget 2001, p. 600). 
Hence, the argumentation for Norwegian participation centred on solidarity with the US – 
Norway’s close ally – and to prove Norway’s relevance within NATO. In other words, an 
argumentation based on realpolitik. 
The issue had been addressed in DUUK on November 30
th
, and the statements by the two 
ministers were not an initiative by the Government. Indeed, it was a rather unusual alliance 
between two parties from opposite sides of the ideological party line, Fremskrittspartiet
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(FrP) and SV, which led to a discussion of the issue in the Storting. FrP and SV had voted to 
have an open debate on Norway’s contribution, though for different reasons; FrP was 
concerned of the funding for a possible Norwegian contribution, while SV found it 
meaningless that Norway should contribute with F-16s when humanitarian aid was what the 
population needed, urging the Government to wait for a political solution (Stortinget 2001). 
The Constitution § 25 was thoroughly discussed as both SV and FrP proposed that the 
Storting made a formal adoption on the contribution to the OEF. SV proposed that the Storting 
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does not consent to place Norwegian armed forces under US-command in Afghanistan, while 
FrP’s proposition was to support Norwegian participation in OEF, in accordance with 
Constitution § 25. The other political parties, however, emphasised the prerogative of 
Norwegian Governments in foreign policy and none of the proposals were amended
32
. 
Moreover, the military contribution presented by the Government was supported by a 
majority of the Storting, with SV as an exception, even though it was viewed as unlikely that 
the US would make use of the contribution (Aftenposten 2001b). Hence, the interjections by 
FrP and SV were turned down and the prerogative of the Norwegian Government underlined. 
Nonetheless, one could argue that a crack in the established political consensus in Norway’s 
foreign policy can be noted within this issue. 
In 2005, there was another change of government. While the Bondevik II Government 
supported OEF, the Stoltenberg II Government
33
 withdrew the Norwegian forces from the 
OEF and channelized all forces to support the NATO-led ISAF (Frost-Nielsen 2011, p. 360). 
Prime Minister Stoltenberg emphasised that the Government wished for a strong UN, and to 
show a will to contribute to this: “Norway shall be a significant peace nation. Norway will not 
contribute to a preventive attack which is not authorised by the UN” (cited in NTB 2005b). 
Arguably, with the new Government, idealpolitik was brought to the forefront. 
Commenting on the shift in Norwegian contributions, Sverre Diesen, Chief of Defence 
from 2005 to 2009, said he spent some time explaining to the other NATO Chiefs of Defence 
that the new Norwegian position – which one perhaps would not expect – was due to the 
special constellation of government, which included, for the first time, a far left party [i.e. 
SV]. Hence, it was not a shift of line in foreign policy as such, but rather an effort to keep the 
coalition together (Diesen 2013). According to Diesen this was understood and accepted by 
allies, but that NATO would periodically ask for Norwegian special forces to be deployed to 
the southern region, which in return was, as a routine, declined by the Norwegian Government 
(2013). Accordingly, one can assume that the Norwegian withdrawal came as a surprise to the 
allies, and that the pressure to contribute, and to ease Norwegian caveats, was upheld.  
In a survey from October 2001, less than half of the Norwegians questioned supported the 
attack on Afghanistan by the UK and the US. The survey also showed that Norwegians were 
more hesitant in their support for the intervention in Afghanistan, than they were regarding 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (NTB 2001a). Prime Minister Bondevik expressed 
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understanding for the concern in the public, emphasising that the bombing was an ethical 
dilemma. However, he remained firm in the belief that it was the right thing to do 
(Christensen 2001a). Bondevik furthermore refrained from saying that Norway was at war 
with Afghanistan and underlined his emphasis on humanitarian aid and human rights, though 
since “most other countries have declared war against terrorism – Norway must be solidary” 
(cited in Lynau 2001). Accordingly, the rhetoric used suggests idealpolitik, but underlying 
one can identify realpolitik in the argumentation. 
The public opinion changed to be more supportive of the bombing in Afghanistan, and in 
December 2001 a majority of the population supported the Norwegian offer to send voluntary 
military personnel to Afghanistan (Aftenposten 2001c). Although it is noted that the 
participation has been controversial in the public opinion (Narud et al. 2010), it would seem 
that it was not strong enough to be an obstacle to the decision of Norwegian participation. 
4.2.2 The first Norwegian bombs – a political awakening 
The Norwegian military contribution to Afghanistan is a challenging case as it has not been a 
homogenous long-term one, but a combination of smaller and larger contributions from 
different actors
34
. Moreover, in January 2002, Norway became head of the Afghanistan 
Support Group and as such responsible for coordinating the efforts of aid-contributing 
countries. Norway has in this regard contributed 5.4 billion NOK in the period of 2001 to 
2011 to Afghanistan, making the country one of the largest recipients of Norwegian 
development aid (Norad 2012). Considering the scope of the present thesis, I focus on the first 
years of the participation, complied with the consequences of the government change in 2005 
for the Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan. 
In November 2001, Norway received an invitation from the US to send Norwegian 
officers to the central command of the OEF in Florida. At first the Bondevik II Government 
was somewhat hesitant, but decided to have a permanent representation at the American 
headquarters, where the officers would be central in further discussions on a possible 
Norwegian contribution (Christensen 2001b). In December 2001 Norway offered six F-16 air 
fighters, four Bell helicopters and a special task force consisting of 100 soldiers to OEF, as a 
response to the abovementioned American requests. 
In 2002 the six F-16 fighter aircrafts were deployed to OEF, marking that for the first time 
since WWII, Norwegian pilots would participate in operations which could lead to bombing 
of ground targets (Christensen 2002a). As opposed to what was the case in Kosovo, the 
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Norwegian F-16s were now upgraded with air-to-ground capacity and were thus able to drop 
bombs. Considering that the Norwegian fighter aircrafts in OEF was under US command, it 
was not given that the Norwegian Government would have the same influence on decisions 
compared to operations under NATO command, in which the principle of consensus applies 
to all levels within the Alliance. Consequently, the fighter aircraft support in OEF was 
conditioned on the Government being in control of the use of the Norwegian F-16s. 
Norwegian ROE’s were also subordinate to the principle of self-defence, there were specific 
demands to the information that could verify ground targets the fighter aircrafts were asked to 
be engaged in, and their use was geographically restricted to Afghanistan (Frost-Nielsen 
2011, pp. 362-3). Moreover, according to the MoD it was accepted by the US that Norwegian 
F-16s could not be given missions that breached Norwegian law or Norway’s international 
obligations (Christensen 2002a).  
Although the contribution of F-16 fighter aircrafts had been given majority support in the 
Storting, the first bombings executed by Norwegian pilots in January 2003 came as a shock. 
Reactions both within the Government and the Storting were that “this was not what we were 
supposed to do”, and SV demanded a report from the Defence Minister on why Norwegian air 
fighters had participated in the bombing and not used the right to reserve from participation 
(Espenes & Haug 2012, p. 28). According to Sigurd Frisvold (2013), Chief of Defence from 
1999 to 2005, there were some politicians, most notably from SV, who believed that the 
Norwegian F-16s would ‘fly in circle’ as they did in Kosovo (i.e. air-to-air operations). It 
seems that the participation suddenly became more ‘real’, shaking up the political milieu back 
home. 
As mentioned, there was a shift in Norway’s contribution to Afghanistan with the 
government change in 2005. All forces were withdrawn from OEF and the contributions were 
channelized to NATO and ISAF. Accordingly, in August 2005 Norway increased its 
contribution to ISAF and assumed command as the leading nation of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymaneh, in North Afghanistan. The geographical 
restriction to the northern region was maintained (Stortinget 2005a). Consequently, Norway 
refrained from sending special forces to South Afghanistan in October 2006 after further 
requests from NATO (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006; Haaland 2007, p. 499). The 
Stoltenberg II Government decided, however, to send four F-16 fighter aircrafts that same 
year. According to Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Ap), this was a response to 
a request from NATO, which was in need of air support due to the expansion of ISAF’s 
mission to new provinces (Stortinget 2005a). The fact that Norway refused some requests but 
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accepted others indicates the need to address the domestic level in order to be able to explain 
the differing Norwegian responses. 
In the debates concerning Norwegian contributions to Afghanistan, the obligations that 
Norway has as a NATO member and the need to show solidarity with the US are repeated. 
Externally, however, the emphasis was on how the Norwegian military participation 
contributed to rebuilding and securing Afghanistan. In a press release by Foreign Minister 
Petersen, the significance of the Norwegian contributions for the Afghan society is 
underlined, stating that the Government makes “a great effort in significant areas such as 
human rights, women’s rights and democratisation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). This 
line of argumentation is pursued in the succeeding government, with Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg outlining three purposes for the Norwegian contributions: 
We are there to stabilise and contribute to security. […] We are there to give the 
[Afghan] population schools, health care and other basic services. […] We are 
there to give the whole country better governance and well-working institutions 
(Stoltenberg 2007). 
The importance of Norwegian forces in this regard was based on the argument that when 
Norwegian soldiers patrol in the north they contribute to the stability necessary for a local 
society to rebuild itself. This was also the justification of the Norwegian bombing in 2003, to 
which Defence Minister Krohn Devold stated that the force contributes to a “stabilisation of 
the security situation in Afghanistan” (cited in Johnsen 2003). Chief for the PRT Meymaneh 
the first six months of 2009, Colonel Ivar Knotten, however, was under the impression that 
initially, the most important issue politically was to join the operation, and thereby be visible 
(cited in Henriksen 2013b, p. 10). Furthermore, it is indicated that no overall military strategy 
or clearly defined objectives for what the Norwegian forces were to achieve is to be found for 
the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan (Henriksen 2013b). It would seem, as in the case 
of Kosovo, that Norway participated in solidarity with the US and NATO rather than the aim 
to have a real impact on the result. 
The OEF and ISAF were supported by Norway. Nevertheless, it was important to retain 
national control and restrict the use of Norwegian forces through the many national caveats. 
Considering the pressure for contributions to the more fight intense regions and that a 
cohesive NATO is essential for Norwegian security, an explanation to the national caveats 
must arguably come from the domestic level. 
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4.3 Iraq: the Norwegian ‘no’ 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 20
th
 2003, by a US-led coalition. The 
argument for an invasion was allegedly the fear of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
being used by the Hussein regime or coming into the hands of terrorists – which would be too 
large a security threat for the US to let happen (Bush 2002).  
After a speech by Bush, calling on the UN to enforce previous resolutions against Iraq, 
UN Resolution 1441 was amended in the UNSC on November 8
th
 2002 (Nye 2009, p. 194). It 
stated that Iraq had not complied with UN resolutions adopted after the Gulf War in 1991, but 
which could be rectified if Iraq allowed unrestricted inspections of its facilities (UN Security 
Council 2002). Accordingly, several inspections were carried out in the country by UN 
inspectors, but lack of willingness from Baghdad did not lead to any conclusive reports on the 
possibility of Iraq being in possession of WMD (UN 2003). In this regard US Foreign 
Minister Colin Powell presented on February 5
th
 2003 evidence on the account of Saddam 
Hussein being in possession of WMD. The trustworthiness of the evidence, however, was 
considered with scepticism by many in the UN. The UNSC was unable to agree on another 
resolution authorising an attack against Iraq, yet the US went to war – its unipolar position 
becoming even clearer. 
The case of Iraq caused a deep split in NATO, in which there was strong opposition to an 
intervention, first and foremost voiced by France and Germany (Lindley-French 2007, pp. 13-
15). The US used every chance available to secure international support for an intervention in 
Iraq; the NATO summit in Prague, December 2002, was dominated by Bush and his efforts to 
get support for overthrowing Hussein, overshadowing the actual agenda, which among other 
issues concerned a new NATO enlargement (Lund 2002). The American view was that 
NATO had a moral duty to help the US in a war against Iraq, and presented a list of 
contributions which Alliance members could provide, should there be an attack on Iraq (NTB 
2002). Despite the lack of a UN mandate, several states interpreted the situation as to give 
provision for an invasion based on the fact that Iraq had not complied with UN Resolution 
1441. This was the conclusion of Denmark and the Czech Republic, which were among the 
first NATO allies to give a positive response to the American request for support. 
4.3.1 The UN, public opinion and US pressure 
In 2002 Norway had a seat in the UNSC and Norwegian diplomats played a key role in the 
wording of UN Resolution 1441 (Sønstelie et al. 2003). During the period in which the US 
pressured for international support and the issue of Iraq was discussed in the UNSC, the 
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Bondevik II Government remained expectant on the UN and refused to comment on what 
would happen should the UNSC fail to reach an agreement on the situation (Johnsen 2002a). 
The American ambassador to Norway, John Doyle Ong, stated that the US expected a 
“significant Norwegian war effort”, and should there be an invasion, the US would request 
more or less the same contribution as was given in Afghanistan (cited in Selmer 2002). In 
February 2003, a request for a contribution of special forces was directed to Norway. The 
Norwegian capability was, according to the US, needed as few special soldiers had the 
required training that was necessary for an effective effort in Iraq (Røhne 2003). Despite the 
American pressure – which clearly was present – Norway decided not to support the 
intervention in Iraq. Facing US pressure, it seems reasonable to presume that it was easier not 
to support the intervention, as France and Germany voiced such a strong opposition. 
The issue led to an internal struggle in the Government. KrF and Venstre
35
 opposed the 
war, while Høyre
36
 and Foreign Minister Petersen were much more inclined to support the US 
(Skjeseth 2003). As mentioned, the Government awaited the process in the UNSC. But, 
doubts regarding its Iraq policy arose as Prime Minister Bondevik stated in the media that 
“Norway do not necessarily support an attack on Iraq, even with a new resolution from the 
UN Security Council” (cited in Stavanger Aftenblad 2003). The Government’s position was, 
however, soon clarified in the media by State Secretary Vidar Helgesen (H) from the MFA: 
Norway is obliged by international law to give political support to the UN 
resolution if the Security Council provides a mandate for a military action in Iraq. 
There should be no doubt (cited in Mosveen & Næsfeldt 2003 [my emphasis]). 
Bondevik was clearly in a tight spot, expressing that “to weigh for or against a war is a painful 
dilemma both to me and other heads of governments” (cited in Ellingsen 2003). 
The now clarified UN line of the Bondevik II Government was supported by a majority in 
the Storting on January 30
th
, with an exception of Senterpartiet
37
 (Sp) and SV. The two 
opposition parties criticised the Government for being too passive regarding the increased 
danger of the US going to war against Iraq (Litland & Werner 2003). In a feature article on 
February 21
st
, Bondevik argued that single countries cannot choose side tracks that undermine 
the UN strategy, and warned against “pre-conclusions that removes the pressure that needs to 
exist in order to get Saddam Hussein to cooperate” (Bondevik 2003). It would seem that the 
previous concern was removed and that the position was set. As US President Bush called to 
ask for support, Prime Minister Bondevik could give a clear no. Bush allegedly accepted the 
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reference to ethical and Christian values, and the opposition in the public (Græger 2005b, p. 
99). 
In the Storting on March 21
st
, a majority of the parliamentarians gave consent to Norway’s 
position. The only interjection came from Frp, who argued that the Government had failed 
Norway’s friends by not giving assent to the resolution proposition from the US, the UK and 
Spain (Stortinget 2003). Bondevik underlined that as opposed to Kosovo there was an 
alternative in continued weapon inspections, emphasising that it was not a question of 
choosing side; “we are to lay down our policy and follow it consistently, and that is what we 
have done” (cited in Stortinget 2003, p. 2303). 
The intervention in Iraq met strong opposition in the public opinion. The resistance 
followed the same pattern as in many other countries across the globe. On February 15
th
 2003, 
demonstrations against a war in Iraq were arranged in up to 60 countries, in which millions of 
people took part in marches and rallies (BBC 2003). The demonstrations in Norway this day 
were the largest in Norway’s history. 120 000 demonstrated country-wide, of them 60 000 
gathered in Oslo (Olsen & Henriksen 2003); making it the largest in Scandinavia 
(Klassekampen 2003). With the demonstrations, criticism towards the Government’s UN 
‘track’ followed, accusing it for being too passive in regard to the US (Olsen & Henriksen 
2003; Moe et al. 2003).  
Although Norway did not support the intervention in Iraq, it contributed in the aftermath. 
The Norwegian participation in the NATO-led stability forces in Iraq has been interpreted as 
an effort to repair the relationship with the US and as compensation for not participating in 
the actual Iraq war (Græger 2005b). On the question of Iraq, Morten Høglund (2013)
38
 noted 
that officially, Norway’s lack of support was accepted but that there was some grumbling 
from allies. Moreover, he maintained that Denmark was politically rewarded for its support 
and enjoyed a better position with the Americans, at least for some time. This underlines that 
when it comes to possible adverse consequences, pressure from the international community 
and close allies must at all times be a part of the evaluation of a government in terms of its 
foreign policy. 
4.4 Libya: little Norway flexes muscles 
In 2011, civil war broke out in Libya between forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and 
Libyan rebellion forces. The brutal actions taken by Gaddafi against Benghazi were 
condemned by the international community, and in February the UNSC amended Resolution 
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1970, posing sanctions, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze against the Libyan regime (UN 
Security Council 2011a). Moreover, the African Union (AU) and the Arab League were 
strongly critical to the actions taken by the Gaddafi regime, and the latter suspended Libya 
from its sessions and called for a no-fly zone (Daalder & Stavridis 2012). 
A new resolution was adopted on March 17
th
, after a proposal by France, Lebanon and the 
UK; UN Resolution 1973 gave a broad mandate, authorising “all necessary measures” to 
protect civilians in Libya, including a no-fly zone (UN Security Council 2011b)
39
. The 
resolution is viewed as historical as it connected the use of military force to the UN clause 
Responsibility to Protect – a principle which came into the UN resolutions in 2005, calling for 
the international community to intervene when governments fail to prevent and halt mass 
atrocities and genocide of own civilians (UN n.d.). The Arab League played an important part 
in the formulation of the UN Resolution 1973, and for the Western countries it was crucial to 
include the whole region as to avoid ‘the West against the rest’ (NTB 2011a). 
The follow-up of UN Resolution 1973 was discussed on March 19
th
 in a summit in Paris, 
initiated by Britain and France. Although the two countries encouraged an intervention, they 
let Lebanon be the driving force in the UNSC (Dagbladet 2011). While the US took 
preliminary command of the military intervention, which was launched in March 19
th
 as 
Operation Odyssey Dawn, they wanted to reduce their role in the military campaign and to 
ensure that the burden of enforcing the UN resolution was shared (BBC 2011b). 
There were intense discussions in NAC on the role of the Alliance. According to 
diplomatic sources in NATO, Turkey blocked an agreement on NATO enforcing the no-fly 
zone (Dagsavisen 2011), joined by Germany in making it difficult for the Alliance to agree on 
a common strategy. US President Obama, wishing for a limited part, urged NATO to play a 
co-ordinating role (BBC 2011b). However, as France and Turkey opposed NATO taking the 
lead, the Alliance could not command the operation from the outset as the consent of all 28 
members is required. The French reluctance was based on the Arab League not wanting the 
operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility
40
, but French Foreign Minister 
Juppé eventually accepted that a NATO role was necessary (Marcus 2011). 
NATO later reached an agreement to take on the whole operation, whereby NATO 
General Secretary Rasmussen stated that the Alliance would enforce all aspects of the UN 
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resolution, “nothing more, nothing less” (cited in BBC 2011c). Operation Unified Protector 
was launched on March 27
th
, involving 18 nations: 14 NATO member states and four partner 
countries. It seems that US reluctance and pressure, led to agreement in the Alliance; with the 
US seeking a limited role, NATO was the next ‘obvious’ candidate for a complex multi-
national mission like the Libyan operation (Marcus 2011). Several NATO members did not 
contribute directly in the operation, some due to lack of resources, but also others with 
available capabilities, e.g. Germany and Poland, abstained from participating (Daalder & 
Stavridis 2012). Norway, on the other hand, was soon to be in the front line. 
4.4.1 Yes by SMS 
The process that led to Norway’s participation in Libya happened remarkably fast. There was 
little time for a discussion in the Storting, and the public debate on the intervention was rather 
limited when considering the gravity of the situation and the possible implications. Due to the 
urgency in the Libyan situation, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap) contacted the 
parliamentarian leaders of the opposition parties on March 18
th
 by telephone. Supposedly 
circumstances made it difficult to gather the parliamentarians for a meeting (Johansen 2011a). 
Nonetheless, according to Støre the telephone conversations revealed broad support for the 
Government’s decision (Støre 2011). Later, in an interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NRK), the leader of Venstre, Trine Skei Grande, could not recall speaking with 
Støre and had allegedly only received an SMS regarding the matter (NRK 2013).  
Before UN Resolution 1973, Norway was rather reluctant, but once a resolution was 
adopted, it was among the first in line for an intervention (Dagbladet 2011). Støre underlined 
that Norway wished to be in front in the follow-up of the resolution – “in terms of 
humanitarian aid, as well as politically and militarily” (cited in NTB 2011c). Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg emphasised the urgency of the matters – enforced by the reports and photos from 
the situation in Benghazi – and that it was critical to take military action as quickly as possible 
(Sæbø 2011). The significance of having the support of the Arab League and the AU was also 
deemed important in Norway, and decisive for the legitimacy of the operation (NTB 2011d; 
Søreide 2012). 
Only a day prior to the adoption of UN Resolution 1973 there was a debate in the Storting, 
in which the Stoltenberg II Government was criticised for leading an unclear policy regarding 
Libya and the prospects of a no-fly zone. The criticism was rejected by Stoltenberg, stating 
that Norway’s attitude had been clear and consistent the whole time and that “the use of 
military force presupposes a resolution in the Security Council” (cited in NTB 2011b). 
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Morten Høglund (2013) pointed out that it would have been unreasonable for the Storting to 
oppose the Government at that point, considering that it earlier had demanded action in regard 
to Libya. Concerning the rapid involvement, he stated that the political parties did have the 
possibility to pull the breaks and ask for the issue to be discussed in an extraordinary meeting 
in the Storting (Høglund 2013). Ine Eriksen Søreide (H), leader of DUUFK, underlines that 
between March 21
st
 and March 25
th
, the issue of Libya was discussed in two open 
parliamentary sessions and three meetings in DUUFK (2012); although debates in the 
aftermath indicates opposition to the decision, Søreide emphasises that in reality there was no 
disagreement in the Storting at the time:  
Norway’s participation in the Libyan intervention proved to be divisive for SV. The 
leadership was criticised within the party, whereby Ivar Johansen, the party’s international 
leader, argued that the bombing was the wrong thing to do, while Bård Solhjell, 
parliamentarian leader to SV, argued that it was important to support the UN, but also to stay 
strict to the UN mandate given (Vegstein 2011). Hence, it was the party leadership and the 
politicians in government who were the driving forces for the support of Norwegian 
participation in SV. 
In the media it was commented that Norway’s support of the intervention was important 
and rightful, considering the UN mandate (Aftenposten 2011; Nationen 2011; 
Fædrelandsvennen 2011). The issue of the Norwegian participation being approved by 
telephone has later been hotly debated in the media and among politicians. However, the fact 
that Norwegian fighter aircrafts delivered 569 bombs (Forsvaret 2012), has received less 
attention (Espenes & Haug 2012). This is arguably an indication that Norway has become 
more accustomed to the use of military force. 
4.4.2 World class F-16 
On March 18
th
 it was said that Norway was awaiting the process within NATO regarding the 
Norwegian contribution, but that air forces was most relevant (NTB 2011b). Shortly after the 
Paris summit it was announced from government sources that Norway was sending six F-16 
fighter aircrafts (Bondevik 2011). Normally it takes a few months to work out the orders and 
prepare for deployment, but within only 100 hours the F-16s could take off from Norway 
(Lunde 2012). 
There was a unison political agreement that it was important and decisive that 
Norway responded to the request of the UN when the UN in the end managed to 
agree on the principle to protect civilians (Søreide 2012, p. 87). 
46 
 
Due to the rapid development of the situation in Libya and the on-going discussion on the 
role of NATO, the structure of command was not elucidated at the time Norway confirmed its 
contribution. Thus, as the F-16s left Norway it was unclear which base they would operate 
from, which tasks they would perform, and under which command (Iversen 2011). The 
uncertainty regarding commando structure was not viewed by the Government as 
problematic; Defence Minister Grete Faremo (Ap) ensured that the Norwegian forces would 
not be put into action before the structure of command was established, emphasising that an 
effective commando and clear access to the procedure was important in order to ensure that 
Norwegian military force was under national control (Kruhaug & Bondevik 2011). 
Apart from staying strict to the UN mandate given for the intervention, Norway did not 
pose national caveats in addition to NATO’s concept of operation and ROEs (Lunde 2012, p. 
95). Consequently, Norwegian F-16 fighter aircrafts flew missions to which other countries 
had made reservations, and was as such in front-line of the operation. Compared to the cases 
of Kosovo and Afghanistan, the reluctance of using force seems to be reduced to a significant 
degree. This is underlined by the fact that the Norwegian contribution has been presented with 
pride by the Government in the aftermath (NRK 2011; Johansen 2011b). The Norwegian 
effort has also received praise internationally, among others from US President Obama, 
NATO General Secretary Rasmussen, and Commander of NATO’s mission in Libya, General 
Bouchard (Eide 2012, p. 18).  
Sverre Diesen and Morten Høglund both emphasised that the case of Libya stands out in 
terms of the time frame, and that it is likely that Norway in future intervention will be more 
restrictive with its contributions (Diesen 2013; Høglund 2013). Nevertheless, considering the 
urgency of the matter, and Høglund’s statement that it would have been unnatural for the 
Storting to pull the breaks, this does not explain the large contribution Norway decided to 
give. Indeed, Dag Henriksen pointed out that a more limited support would rather be the 
norm, given the fact that Norway up until then had dropped seven bombs since WWII. “Thus, 
it would be fair to assume that Norway surprised itself, as well as its allies, by contributing as 
forcefully as it did” (Henriksen 2013c). 
Commenting on the Norwegian use of force in Libya, Diesen (2013) argued that this has 
less to do with the political will to do things others were reluctant to do, rather than the fact 
that Norwegian pilots are among the best when it comes to precision bombing. He admitted, 
however, that it is interesting that Norway did not use the same restrictions as in Afghanistan: 
“had there been a political unwillingness for a more aggressive operation in Libya, Norway 
could have claimed that this is too difficult” (Diesen 2013). The arguably changed Norwegian 
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attitude is further strengthened by the surprised reactions of the international community; the 
expectations were not there internationally, and there are therefore reasons to look for answers 
domestically. 
4.5 From reluctance to the front line 
The analysis of the four case studies indicates that there is a development in Norway’s 
participation in international military operations. Of course one should keep in mind that the 
situation and context of each case impacts the outcome. Nevertheless, in addition to the 
technological development that is exemplified by the changed capacity of the F-16’s in 
Kosovo to Libya, there also seems to be a changed attitude in Norway concerning the use of 
force under international auspices. Moreover, some questions remain unanswered; how can 
the many caveats in Afghanistan be explained, and the lack thereof in Libya? And, 
considering the evident Norwegian reluctance in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, why was 
Norway suddenly in front-line in Libya? The following chapter seeks to address these 
questions by applying the two-level-games model to the empirics, as well as further 
investigating my argument that a development in ability and willingness can be noted through 
the four case studies of the present thesis.  
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5 The two-level games of Norway’s decision of participation 
The present chapter applies the two-level games to the empirics. The purpose is to shed light 
on similarities or trends that can be identified in the four case studies. As indicated in the 
analysis above, there are decisions to which an explanation cannot be found on the structural 
level. Hence, neo-realism is not sufficient to explain the whole picture of the Norwegian 
participation and the contributions, and we need to open the ‘black box’ of the Norwegian 
state. 
The model of two-level games emphasises that the international and the domestic levels 
are intertwined. I have, however, as Putnam, divided the analysis according to the two levels 
due to expository purposes. The first section assesses the international level (Level I) with a 
particular focus on the dualism of realpolitik and idealpolitik in Norwegian foreign policy. 
The second section addresses Level II and the ratification of Norway’s participation and of 
the Norwegian contributions, with Level I constraints taken into consideration. The last 
section of the chapter reflects on the argued development of Norway’s participation in 
international military operations. 
5.1 Level I: expectations and allied pressure 
Regarding the use of military force on the international stage, Norway has never been in the 
forefront. It is noted that domestic decision-makers and societal actors consider international 
pressures when addressing the decision to use or support the use of force (Mingst 2007, p. 
77). Moreover, according to neo-realism, Norway is dependent on stronger states and their 
actions when it comes to foreign policy. This is underlined with the Norwegian membership 
in NATO, which was a result of externally induced pressure.  
While NATO became a basis for realpolitik, idealpolitik is reflected in Norway’s 
emphasis on the UN and the aim of constructing a world order based on international law. 
Accordingly, Norway emphasises both NATO and the UN as cornerstones in its foreign 
policy. This dualism arguably leads to two different Level I induced expectations faced by 
Norwegian governments. Consequently, it can produce strategic dilemmas for the 
Government when the two are incompatible but also open up for strategic opportunities when 
they coincide, as will be addressed in the following analysis. 
The events in Yugoslavia became a test for NATO and its existence. It is argued that it 
was not given that NATO was to be the dominant actor in the Kosovo crisis. However, the 
continuous threats of using NATO forces against Milosevic by leading Alliance members, 
tied NATO, as an alliance, to the US approach of using coercive diplomacy (Eide 2000, p. 
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38). Hence, the pressure for member countries to participate was quite strong; it was a “to be 
or not to be” for NATO, and for Norway this was quite serious seeing the high value it puts 
on the Alliance in its security and defence policy
41
. 
That the intervention in Kosovo lacked UN authorisation and Norway nonetheless decided 
to participate, demonstrates the significance of, and the pressure within NATO. Kosovo came 
as a shock to Norway but politicians realised that a more active role was needed to improve 
Norway’s military reputation in the Alliance (Haaland 2007, p. 497). Hence, as the diplomatic 
efforts failed, the expectations following Norway’s realpolitik were perceived as stronger than 
the expectations due to its idealpolitik – reflecting the tension of what Norway wants and 
what Norway needs to do to ensure state security. 
In the case of Afghanistan, Article 5 was invoked and a UN authorisation was provided. 
Thus, considering the situation, the Norwegian support of the intervention is not that 
surprising with both NATO and the UN consenting to the operation. Political support was 
expressed instantly, but at the same time Norway remained rather hesitant in regard to 
contributions. In a two-level game, however, expectational effects are important (Putnam 
1988, p. 436), and the Bondevik II Government clearly felt the expectation of contributing. 
 In the Storting on December 5
th
 2001, Defence Minister Krohn Devold (H) argued that it 
was important to offer Norwegian contributions directly to the US, as already done by other 
coalition countries. She further emphasised that “Norway is the only allied country which is 
represented in the American headquarters in Florida, and has not yet clarified a specific 
military contribution” (cited in Stortinget 2001, p. 600). Moreover, the importance of 
demonstrating capability, and honour collective defence obligations within NATO was 
explicitly underlined by Krohn Devold and Foreign Minister Petersen (H) (Stortinget 2001).  
What is interesting, is the different Norwegian contributions in Afghanistan and the 
national caveats which followed. As pointed out, NATO has struggled with overcoming the 
different national restrictions, as they pose problems for the commanders regarding the utility 
of the forces at hand (Morelli & Belkin 2009, p. 10). In this regard the US has continuously 
pressed ISAF troop contributors to drop or ease national caveats (NTB 2005a; Bowman & 
Dale 2009, p. 59). Moreover, in 2005, Norway was under heavy pressure from NATO, and 
Britain in particular, to do more in Afghanistan, especially in the south (Frost-Nielsen 2013, 
p. 9). Nonetheless, the Norwegian Level II (national) caveats were applied despite Level I 
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 Some argue that after the demise of the Soviet Union, the value put on NATO has declined and that it is less 
important to member states with regard to security (Brawley & Martin 2000). However, in the case of Norway, 
NATO continues to be important as Russia is still regarded as a possible threat (see chapter 3). 
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(international) pressure. A suggested explanation for these will be addressed in the 
examination of Level II in the following section. 
During the period of the Bondevik II Government, Norwegian contributions to UN peace-
keeping operations declined and more focus was given to the operation in Afghanistan. As 
Foreign Minister Petersen stated: “the most important is what we do, not whether we have a 
UN helmet or not” (cited in Johnsen 2002c). The Norwegian cuts occurred despite strong 
encouragement by the UN of rich countries to bear a greater burden of UN peace operations 
(Johnsen 2002b). The Norwegian Government thus faced Level I pressure from two 
directions: on the one hand the UN and on the other the US and NATO. MFA officials 
expressed concern about the symbolic effect of the withdrawal, arguing that it could weaken 
Norway’s credibility in the UN (Johnsen 2002b). Evaluating the two Level I expectations and 
considering the outcome, an interpretation is that it was viewed as more beneficial to national 
interest to support the US in Afghanistan, in light of the security guarantee, rather than 
contributing to the UN.   
In the case of Iraq there was extensive US pressure for support and contributions. A 
feature of bargaining in the two-level context is that leaders attempt to manipulate the 
domestic situations of their counterparts during the negotiation process (Putnam 1988, p. 454; 
Eichenberg 1993, p. 67). Accordingly, US President Bush made several attempts at 
convincing allies to support an intervention in Iraq. Moreover, the case by US Foreign 
Minister Colin Powell in February 2003, was arguably a strong attempt to turn unconvinced 
countries. Regarding the stiff opposition in the Norwegian public opinion, US ambassador 
John Doyle Ong, reminded the Norwegian population of the long cooperation with the US: 
Let us not forget the solid basis of goodwill that exists between our countries, 
and which assents from historical ties, family relations and positive experiences 
from exchanges, tourist visits and studies in each other’s countries (cited in Fyhn 
2002b).  
Hence, the US ambassador tried to alter the perceptions of the costs of no-agreement (i.e. no 
support); by not supporting the US, Norway challenged the good relationship, and implicitly 
the security guarantee it provided. Despite US pressure, however, Norway chose not to 
support the intervention of Iraq, although it led to more chilled relations with the US – 
indicating importance of domestic factors. 
Libya was a counter regime operation with a broad UN mandate. A surprise to all, 
Norway was in the forefront – contributing to an extent that was not expected among allies 
(Henriksen 2013a, p. 32). Implicitly, the expectations on Level I are in the case of Libya not 
significantly strong enough in order to explain the heavy Norwegian contribution. Although 
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initially hesitant, the Stoltenberg II Government responded quickly when UN Resolution 1973 
was amended. Arguably, the more a state emphasises the UN and values a world order based 
on international law for the state’s security, the stronger the obligation is felt among policy 
makers to follow up on UN resolutions. In the statement on the Libya intervention to the 
Storting on March 29
th
 2011, Prime Minister Stoltenberg (Ap) stated that:  
Our engagement [in Libya] builds upon a long line in Norwegian foreign policy, 
namely the support of a UN-led world order, in which the use of force is 
regulated by the UN pact and Security Council resolutions (cited in Stortinget 
2011, pp. 3133-4).  
The importance of supporting the UN in the case of Libya is also confirmed by Morten 
Høglund (2013). However, the question remains: why did Norway contribute to such an 
extent?  
As we have seen there are international factors that can explain Norway’s participation in 
international military operations. Especially in the case of Kosovo, international factors give a 
strong explanation to the Norwegian decision to participate. Nevertheless, they cannot explain 
all aspects of the different contributions in Afghanistan, the position of the Norwegian 
Government regarding the US and the war in Iraq, nor the heavy contribution in Libya. 
Hence, the following analysis addresses Level II and the domestic win-sets, which provides 
further understanding for the decisions to participate or not to participate. 
5.2 Level II: the ratification phase 
In all political systems, decisions to deploy and use military forces are among the most 
important that can be taken. As outlined in chapter 3, the Norwegian Government have a 
prerogative in this regard but the gravity that follows such decisions implies that support from 
Level II constituents is important. This section will firstly address the public opinion and the 
media, thereafter the different win-sets, and lastly the chief negotiator. 
5.2.1 Public opinion and the role of the media 
In terms of security issues and international affairs, it is argued that the public opinion does 
not have a significant constraint on the governments’ win-sets, but that it can play a central 
role in sensitive security policy decisions when it is perceived as important (Trumbore 1998). 
As pointed out, the cases in the present analysis concern low-intensity conflicts and do not 
present an imminent threat against the Norwegian territory or population. The operations have 
taken place far away from Norwegian borders, and are presumably harder to relate to than 
other domestic issues as they do not affect the everyday life of common Norwegians. 
Moreover, in Iraq and Libya there were no Norwegian casualties, one soldier died serving 
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KFOR in Kosovo, while in Afghanistan, from 2001 to present date, there have been ten 
casualties (Soldat/Veteran Portalen n.d)
42
. Presumably, had there been a greater risk for 
Norwegian casualties, the attention and resistance to Norwegian participation in international 
military operations would have been greater. 
With the increased military participation, the justification by Norwegian governments has 
to a large extent been drawn on the peace discourse (Græger & Leira 2005). Arguably the 
rhetoric used by the politicians, to prevent violations on human rights, securing democracy 
and stability, has been to defend the participation to the public in forms of idealpolitik. The 
different pronouncement by the politicians can be seen as an effort to address concerns in the 
Norwegian population and reminding them of why Norwegian soldiers participate. Arguably 
this has been especially important in the case of the participation in Afghanistan, which is 
now in its twelfth year. Moreover, consistently the subsequent Norwegian governments have 
argued, in all cases, that Norway is not at war in the traditional sense. In an interview related 
to the four casualties in Afghanistan in 2010, Prime Minister Stoltenberg underlined this: “We 
participate in war-like actions, but from an international law perspective we are not at war” 
(cited in Olsen et al. 2010). 
In the above analysis of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya there is no indication of the 
decision to participate were taken as a response to public opinion. Accordingly, I argue that 
the public opinion did not affect the domestic win-sets of the operations to a significant 
degree. But as argued above, Norwegian governments still consider the view of the public. 
According to Høglund, the public opinion is not unimportant in this regard. He underlines, 
however, that there are other political questions that get far more attention and generate more 
reactions, such as drilling for oil in Lofoten and electricity grids across the Hardanger fjord, 
which mobilise the population to a much greater extent (Høglund 2013). 
The case of Iraq is another matter. The fact that the national gathering in February 2003 
was the largest in Norwegian history at the time is arguably not something a government can 
refuse to listen to. An interesting indication on the opposite is Foreign Minister Petersen. 
According to sources close to Petersen, he was not particularly affected by the demonstrations 
– it was his duty as foreign minister to secure the cornerstone in Norwegian security and 
defence policy, and that a disturbance at the home was tolerable (Gjerde 2008a). One could 
thus argue that a strong opposition in the public opinion needs to be convincing to the 
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 Note that the list of Norwegian casualties during military service is not official, but compared to sources I have 
looked into suggest that the list is accurate. Furthermore, the reader should be aware of that the list also includes 
casualties under military training in Norway. 
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decision-makers in order to have an impact on the win-set. This seems to be the case for 
Prime Minister Bondevik (KrF).  
A war against Iraq was heavily criticised by the Church, which directed its pressure 
towards the Christian Prime Minister (Løkeland-Stai 2003). Bondevik used a lot of time to 
ensure the public that he was against war (Narum 2003), and his statement of not supporting 
the UN, indicates that he was very much affected by the public sentiment. Bondevik proved to 
be decisive for the Iraq win-set, which will be addressed below, and the public opinion 
arguably played a central, but not a key role in this case; although two thirds of Norwegians 
opposed the war, regardless of the outcome in the UNSC (Narum 2003), the Government 
stayed on its UN ‘track’. 
As with the public opinion, the empirics in the four case studies do not suggest that media 
has been an important factor in the domestic win-sets. It is argued that the Norwegian media 
is not an autonomous political actor, but rather a communicative prolongation of the 
consensus in Norwegian foreign policy, and as such an integrated part of the Norwegian 
foreign policy culture (Thune et al. 2006). This view is supported in the four case studies of 
the present thesis. An example is the editorial comment by Aftenposten to the hesitant attitude 
of Norway after 9/11: “Right at this moment, clumsy statements ruin decades of efforts to 
build goodwill for Norway in the US” (Aftenposten 2001a). Moreover, although critical to the 
approval of Norway’s participation in Libya per telephone, the media was supportive of the 
Norwegian participation. There may be a shift, however. NRK broadcasted in March 2013 a 
documentary seeking to shed new light on the Norwegian participation in Libya. It questioned 
the heavy contribution and the broad national support without a formal debate in the Storting 
(NRK 2013). Then again, apart from being commented in some editorials and feature articles 
(see Aftenposten 2013, Morgenbladet 2013; Dagsavisen 2013; Gjerdåker 2013; Lodgaard 
2013) the debate in the media has not been extensive after the documentary
43
. 
5.2.2 The size of the win-sets 
In the case of Kosovo I argue that the fact that the future of NATO was tied to the operation 
was decisive for the domestic win-set. The Bondevik I Government long remained reluctant 
to an intervention and sought as long as possible to work for a political solution to the crisis. 
As the situation escalated, however, the Government was given unanimously consent from all 
the political parties in the Storting – even from the ‘war critical socialists’. The limiting factor 
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 I make this argument after a search in Atekst, a Nordic media archive, for ‘Libya’ in all Norwegian newspaper 
from 12 March 2013, the date of the NRK documentary on Libya, to the present. 
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on the win-set (i.e. the need for a UN mandate) was thus removed by emphasising the 
‘principle of necessity’. Consequently the domestic win-set was expanded, making it possible 
to ratify Norwegian participation as the prospect of status quo (i.e. not participating) was not 
evaluated by the decision makers to be in the interest of the state (i.e. realpolitik). Hence, as 
outlined in chapter four, although both idealpolitik and realpolitik are evident in the 
justification of the participation, the Level I expectation following Norway’s NATO 
membership provides the strongest explanation for Norway’s participation in Kosovo.  
Compared to Kosovo the participation in Afghanistan met more domestic opposition, 
especially from SV. However, with Article 5 invoked and a UN mandate amended, there was 
a wide win-set for participating in Afghanistan – underlined by the broad political consensus 
in the Storting. Norwegian participation in OEF was justified by the need to show alliance 
solidarity and making Norway relevant within NATO. As the US called for the use of the six 
F-16s in 2002, the contribution was viewed by Defence Minister Krohn Devold as “good 
foreign policy”, enabling Norway to demonstrate its relevance as an ally (cited in Frost-
Nielsen 2011, p. 367). 
Despite a broad Afghanistan win-set, there was concern internally in the Bondevik II 
Government regarding the F-16 contribution. The F-16s were now upgraded and could thus 
make a greater contribution than in Kosovo. Consequently, there were some in the 
Government who feared an escalation of the intensity in international contributions (Frost-
Nielsen 2011, p. 371). The opposition party SV argued that the chance for ‘friendly-fire 
incidents’ striking civilians was great and that Norway should withdraw from the OEF and 
rather focus on ISAF (Christensen 2002b). In order to address domestic concern, the 
Government posed national caveats on the contribution. The importance of this is underlined 
by the repeated statements by Government officials that the Norwegian F-16s were under 
national control (see Christensen 2002a; Huus-Hansen 2002; Tjønn 2002). Hence, with these 
conditions the Government was able to enhance own ability to satisfy domestic pressure and 
at the same time meet Level I expectations to contribute. 
The case of Iraq proved to be a very difficult issue for the Bondevik II Government. As 
mentioned, KrF and Venstre were strongly opposed to the war (Skjeseth 2003). Høyre, on the 
other hand, was willing to go much further in the support of the US, despite the risk of 
overstretch considering the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan (Fyhn 2002a; Udgaard 
2006, p. 62). In a two-level game, in which central actors have diverging views on what is 
‘national interests’, acceptability-sets need to overlap in order to make a ratification feasible 
(Putnam 1988, p. 438). In the Iraq win-set I argue that two related strategic dilemmas were 
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present, to which the acceptability-sets of the different coalition parties in the Government 
needed to overlap. The first concerns idealpolitik and the need to guard Norwegian attitudes 
and actions in international law as expressed through UN resolutions; the second entails an 
evaluation of the consequences by breaking with one of the cornerstones in Norwegian 
foreign policy – the good relationship with the US. 
Considering the idealpolitik dilemma, there was a dispute in the Government due to 
different perceptions on what the UN ‘track’ entailed. KrF and Venstre awaited a clear UN 
resolution, while their coalition partner Høyre perceived the interpretation of the existing UN 
Resolution 1441 as sufficient basis for an intervention (Ulstein & Nielsen 2003). As stated by 
Foreign Minister Petersen: “To put it this way, [the British interpretation] is not bad 
reasoning” (cited in Simonsen 2003). Despite the position fronted by Petersen, there was also 
disagreement within Høyre, as central politicians from the party had marked their opposition 
to the US, creating hope for a solution to the internal struggle in the Government. US Foreign 
Secretary Powell’s case in the UNSC on February 5th made an impression however, and the 
argumentation of Petersen received renewed attention within the party (Gjerde 2008a). As 
such, Powell’s presentation had a reverberating effect on the Iraq win-set. Consequently, there 
was new uncertainty in the Government on what the point of view would be from Høyre, and 
consequently uncertainty with regard to a possible ratification of Norway’s position. 
The win-set was further complicated by Prime Minister Bondevik, who was stuck between 
a rock and a hard place. The Bondevik II Government, however, settled the dispute regarding 
the UN, confirming that Norway will support a war against Iraq if there is a new UN 
resolution. Hence, the obligations following Norway’s emphasis on a UN-led world order was 
decisive in this matter. As commented by Stoltenberg (Ap): 
It is a basic advantage that there is a broad consensus in difficult foreign policy 
issues. To conclude already now would implicitly weaken the UN. We cannot 
only respect the UN resolutions we like (cited in Johnsen & Mathismoen 2003). 
The other dilemma still remained: what will be the position of Norway, if the US goes to 
war without a clear UN mandate? Foreign Minister Petersen guarded the relationship with the 
US, and was of the opinion that Norway could not afford being at odds with the US, 
considering the loss of strategic significance to the US and NATO after the Cold War (Gjerde 
2008a). In order to minimise the adverse consequences of not supporting the US, Norway’s 
closest ally, and to ensure an overlap of the acceptability-sets within the Government, the 
Norwegian Government settled for a ‘middle way’: not supporting Washington in its war 
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against Iraq but at the same time moderating the criticism of the US, as opposed to Germany, 
France and Sweden, which were much more critical. 
Hence, as US President Bush asked for support, Prime Minister Bondevik could remain 
firm in his answer. Following two-level games, a small win-set can be a bargaining advantage 
in the international negotiations and the smaller the win-set, the less the chief negotiator can 
be ‘pushed’ around by other Level I negotiators (Putnam 1988, p. 440). Now that the position 
was ratified in the Government, Bondevik could justify Norway’s position on the lack of a 
UN mandate. Moreover, the public opinion played an important role in the Iraq win-set, as 
Bondevik could exploit the public sentiment as a reason for not supporting the American 
intervention, and thereby narrowing his win-set further. 
However, the US-Norway relations were still very important to the Bondevik II 
Government – as it has been for all Norwegian governments since 1949. Hence, this can 
explain why Norway contributed with troops to the UN peace-keeping mission in Iraq after 
the intervention. The same argument can be made in the case of the Stoltenberg II 
Government withdrawing Norwegian forces from Iraq, followed by an increase in the 
contribution to ISAF and the second-period deployment of F-16s in 2006. The desire to stay 
on good terms with the US has always been strong in Norwegian foreign policy, and if this 
relationship is threatened, Norwegian politicians make great effort in restoring the balance.  
The change of governments in 2005 had several implications for the Norwegian 
participation in international operations. Norwegian forces were drawn from the US-led OEF, 
and there was a complete withdrawal of the contribution in Iraq. In addition, the participation 
in UN missions was once again given attention (Stoltenberg II Government 2005). The 
Stoltenberg II Government included for the first time in Norwegian government history, a 
radical left party, SV. After the 2001 parliamentary election, in which SV did the best election 
in its history, the party was eager to get into government position as quickly as possible 
(Rossavik 2011, p. 415). In an effort to approach the two possible coalition partners, Ap and 
Sp, the political leadership of SV took a step away from an active opposition to NATO in 
2004, with the argument that NATO no longer was a tool but rather a liability to the 
Americans, avoiding a commotion within the party (Rossavik 2011, p. 430). Although the 
political leadership of SV approached Ap and Sp on the question of NATO, they remained 
critical to the US. Consequently, with the 2005 government change, the Afghanistan win-set 
changed with it. 
The diverging views of the three parties regarding the Norwegian contributions in 
Afghanistan were evident in 2001; while SV voted against Norwegian contributions to the 
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OEF, Ap and Sp gave their full support. Thus, side payments were arguably needed in order to 
get an overlap of the acceptability-sets of SV on the one hand, and Ap and Sp on the other. The 
withdrawal of the Norwegian contribution in Iraq was seemingly not a big side payment given 
to SV, as Ap had already in December 2003 stated that the party did not wish to renew the 
engagement in Iraq (Nybakk in Stortinget 2005b). The decision to withdraw from the OEF 
was, on the other hand, not easy for Ap and Sp to swallow (Rossavik 2011, p. 458). However, 
the US-led OEF, in which the aim was to remove terrorists from Afghanistan, was 
incompatible with the standpoint of SV. ISAF, established by the UN and its purpose of 
reconstructing Afghanistan, was more acceptable – as “the thought of Norway as a peace 
nation and the use of aid as a foreign policy instrument is in the spirit of the party” (Rossavik 
2011, p. 430). By withdrawing from the OEF but at the same time increasing the Norwegian 
efforts in ISAF and assuming command of the PRT in Meymaneh, the Government had a 
domestic win-set in which the acceptability-sets were overlapping. Hence, by moving away 
from the realpolitik cornerstone towards the idealpolitik cornerstone, the win-set complied 
with Level I pressure of contributing, as well as addressing domestic demands in SV. 
The Government chose to make these decisions despite the pressure within NATO and 
criticism from the domestic opposition parties. In the Storting KrF viewed it as unwise to 
withdraw from Iraq, and Høyre and Frp feared that as a consequence of the withdrawal from 
Iraq and OEF, this would negatively affect allied interest in coming to Norway’s aid 
(Stortinget 2005b). However, clearly the interest in holding the new coalition together was 
deemed as more important, and the case exemplifies the autonomy that the Norwegian 
governments have in foreign policy and underlines the consultative role of the Storting. 
Nevertheless, as the two-level-games model helps to picture how the cleavages between the 
domestic and international spheres are intertwined and mutually affecting each other, the case 
of Afghanistan shows that despite the autonomy, the Storting and the international pressure 
within NATO could not be neglected entirely.  
Ap, with Foreign Minister Støre as the driving force in the Government, wished to send 
more troops, as well as special forces to South Afghanistan. Kristin Halvorsen (SV) strongly 
opposed sending Norwegian soldiers to the south, and won the internal battle in the 
Government in the autumn of 2006, and no new troops were sent (Rossavik 2001, p. 470). 
Accordingly, with the strong opposition in SV, the Afghanistan win-set was narrowed and the 
autonomy of the Government was constrained in the negotiations in NATO. However, when a 
new request came in the winter of 2007, the Ap cabinet members increased the pressure 
within the Government, and as a compromise 150 special soldiers were sent to Kabul 
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(Rossavik 2011, p. 470). This issue indicates a strong Level I pressure felt in the Government. 
The involuntary defection of withdrawing from OEF, by which the Stoltenberg II Government 
could not ratify an agreement with allies due to a narrow win-set, arguably led to a need to 
contribute more in other areas as compensation. 
There was also the issue of contributing with F-16s for a second period in 2006 in 
Afghanistan. The opposition to bombing was, as pointed out above, strong within SV. 
However, seeing that the previous Bondevik II Government already had proposed to send F-
16 fighter aircrafts arguably created expectation of a contribution in NATO. Hence, to avoid 
another involuntary defection – which presumably would have weakened Norway’s 
reputation among allies – this needed to be resolved within the Government. The option 
chosen was to expand the win-set by setting national caveats on the F-16 contribution, in 
which Norwegian F-16s were to be under the command of the ISAF operation and not OEF 
(Stortinget 2005a; Frost-Nielsen 2013). 
In the case of Libya the domestic win-set appear to have been broad, and thus the 
autonomy of the chief negotiator. This is underlined as Prime Minister Stoltenberg already at 
the Paris summit on March 19
th
 2011 could announce Norwegian participation with six F-16 
fighter aircrafts. Considering the importance of the UN in Norwegian foreign policy and the 
above analysis, the broad UN mandate for the operation was a decisive factor for the size of 
the Libya win-set. Foreign Minister Støre was long reluctant to a Norwegian participation, but 
as UN Resolution 1973 was passed, this changed his attitude. Hence, the UN mandate 
expanded the win-set and as such facilitated agreement within the Government. The 
importance of the UN mandate is perhaps most strongly underlined as SV, the party long and 
most critical to bombing and the use of force, did not oppose the Norwegian participation 
with one word
44
. That the approval of the Storting and the political parties was sought per 
telephone strengthens this perception. Despite that this way of collecting support was 
criticised at a later point, the Norwegian participation had full support in the Storting. As 
stated by Stoltenberg in the parliamentary debate on March 29
th
 2011:  
It has been a while since we have had so unreserved, so concurring and such a 
clear agreement in the Storting regarding the complete support of all parts, of the 
organisation of the military operations and of Norway’s contribution (cited in 
Stortinget 2011, p. 3140). 
There was considerable political risk connected to such a heavy contribution. In this 
regard Putnam underlines the importance of the strategies of the chief negotiator (1988, p. 
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456). Considering the rapid decision, it points to a significance of the motives of Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg, which will be addressed in the following section. 
5.2.3 The Chief Negotiator 
Foreign policy differs from other policy areas as the Storting is not supposed to exercise 
constitutional control with the Government, but to support the Government’s main line in 
foreign policy. Consequently, the autonomy of the Norwegian Government as chief negotiator 
is broad. As previously stressed, however, the case studies in the present analysis concern 
low-intensity conflicts, and as such do not represent an imminent threat to the survival of the 
Norwegian state. Arguably this opens up for an increased influence of domestic constituents 
in security policy matters, as coordination and consensus is not as important compared to the 
Cold War era with the overarching Soviet threat. More open debates concerning Norway’s 
participation in international military operations indicate that the need for consensus is not as 
strong as it previously has been, and which arguably weakens the autonomy of the Norwegian 
Government to negotiate on Level I. 
In the case of Kosovo, the established political consensus in Norwegian foreign policy 
seemed to be stronger than ever, considering that even war-critical SV gave full consent to the 
intervention and Norwegian participation. In the case of Afghanistan, however the prerogative 
of the Norwegian Government (i.e. autonomy of chief negotiator) was on more occasions 
challenged by opposition parties. As mentioned, in 2001, FrP and SV voted in DUUK for an 
open debate regarding the contribution to Afghanistan. Carl I. Hagen (FrP) repeatedly 
referred to § 25 of the Constitution, emphasising the need of consent of the Parliament (Hagen 
in Stortinget 2001). On the question of whether FrP had changed attitude since Kosovo – in 
which the issue of the Constitution had not been addressed – Hagen responded that “we have 
felt that the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee, which is a consultative body, may have 
been used too much” (cited in Stortinget 2001, 607). 
Then in 2002, a coalition of Frp, Sp and SV ensured that the discussions of central 
questions in DUUK with regard to Norwegian participation in international military 
operations were to be debated in the Storting (Leer-Salvesen 2002). Much of the 
argumentation centred on the issue of sending Norwegian military personnel to conflicts far 
away, and as such needed to be discussed in the public room. Accordingly the autonomy of 
the Norwegian Government vis-à-vis the Storting is increasingly challenged and one could 
thus argue that we are seeing a crack in foreign policy consensus. Nonetheless, this point 
should not be exaggerated as the prerogative has been defended by a majority in the Storting. 
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Furthermore, there are indications that point to that the Prime Minister as chief negotiator still 
has a broad autonomy. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Prime Minister’s office is the final 
point of power exertion, and it is argued that when the Norwegian Prime Minister is engaged 
personally, the Prime Minister’s office has large power (Udgaard 2006).  
In the case of Iraq, Prime Minister Bondevik was, as mentioned, in a though dilemma. 
Personally he was against war and faced domestic pressure to take a tougher stand against the 
US. As Prime Minister, however, he had to consider the adverse consequences of foreign 
development by criticising the US. In the position between the two levels, one motive for the 
chief negotiator is to enhance his/her standing in the Level II game by minimising potential 
losses (Putnam 1988, p. 457). It is later revealed that a preliminary memorandum from the 
legal department in the MFA stated that UN Resolution 1441 gave a justified foundation for 
an invasion in terms of international law (Gjerde 2008b). It was to be the basis for Norway’s 
position regarding the intervention in Iraq, and implicitly gave political support to the US and 
the UK. This solution was, however, not acceptable to Bondevik, who pressured for a new 
memorandum. The new version explicitly expressed that there was no pertaining to 
international law for the invasion unless a new resolution was amended, but that UN 
Resolution 1441 under certain circumstances could legitimise use of force (Gjerde 2008b). 
Hence, in his strategic dilemma, Bondevik used his veto power to change the content and thus 
ensure an outcome that consolidated domestic opposition to the US, while at the same time 
presented a mild criticism of the action taken by Washington and London. 
In the case of Libya, Prime Minister Stoltenberg arguably played a key role as the driving 
force of the quick decision to deploy the Norwegian fighter aircrafts. Foreign Minister Støre 
was initially sceptical to a NATO-led operation in Libya and Norwegian participation, and 
argued that it was better for Norway if the US, Britain and France, in cooperation with Arab 
countries executed the operation (Hopperstad et. al 2011). On the one hand, considering that a 
broad UN mandate was amended, it was reasonable that Norway would participate. 
Furthermore, UN resolution 1973 changed the attitude of Foreign Minister Støre, and the 
decision received full support in the Storting. On the other hand, however, the UN mandate 
did not necessarily imply that Norway had to respond so quickly and participate to such an 
extent. Allegedly the urgency of having a decision regarding the F-16 contribution clarified 
was due to Stoltenberg wanting to have an offer to put on the table at the summit in Paris on 
19
th
 March 2011. This perception is outlined by Kristin Halvorsen (SV), stating that “it went 
down too quickly because the Prime Minister wanted a quick decision” (cited in Gjerde 
2012). During the short period between the UN Resolution was amended and the Paris 
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summit, it became clear to Halvorsen that Stoltenberg did not want to come to Paris empty 
handed, and the Prime Minister did not leave much room for alternatives (Sølhusvik 2012, pp. 
376-378). In terms of the two-level game this indicates the third motive for Stoltenberg. That 
is, to pursue own conception of national interest in the international context. Having the 
relevant capability and a broad UN mandate for the participation, Stoltenberg arguably had a 
wide win-set with which he could follow own strategies and motives in the interest of 
Norway.  
5.3 The willingness to risk a strike 
In two-level games, Putnam distinguish between heterogeneous and homogenous issues 
(1988, p. 443), where in the latter the most significant cleavage is likely to be between 
‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, depending on the constituencies’ willingness to risk a strike. In a 
comparison of the four case studies, I argue that these conceptions apply well to Norway’s 
participation in the operations, taking Level I pressures resulting from the dualism in 
Norwegian foreign policy into consideration.  
The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq were heterogeneous, as there were domestic 
opposition both from those who thought the Level I agreement went too far, e.g. SV in the 
Afghanistan win-set and KrF/Sp in the Iraq win-set; and from those who thought it did not go 
far enough, e.g. Ap/Sp in the Afghanistan win-set, and H/FrP in the Iraq win-set. Hence, the 
win-sets were much more complicated, and consequently constraining on the autonomy of the 
Norwegian Government. In the cases of Kosovo and Libya, the interests of the domestic 
constituents were homogenous, as a result of considerations of the adverse consequences of 
foreign development in NATO and the UN. In the Kosovo win-set, the Bondevik I 
Government, finding itself in an unaccustomed situation and without relevant capabilities, had 
a ‘dovish’ attitude – contribute with what we must, nothing more. In the Libya win-set there 
was no tension between the two cornerstones of Norwegian foreign policy. The concurrence 
of idealpolitik and realpolitik gave a broader win-set and thus strong autonomy of the chief 
negotiator, than the three other cases. Consequently, I argue that the Stoltenberg II 
Government could assume a ‘hawkish’ position, and with a relevant capability, was able to 
contribute to such an extent in Libya.  
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6 Norway’s participation in international military operations post-Cold 
War 
This chapter extracts the essence of the empirical findings and evaluates the application of the 
two-level games. The primary aim of the present thesis was to evaluate whether there has 
been a development in the Norwegian use of force under international auspices. Accordingly, 
the following two sections elaborate further on two aspects of the indicated development. 
Returning to the research questions, the analysis has shown that Norway’s decision to 
participate in the operations can, to a great extent, be explained by international factors. The 
findings underline that Norway’s NATO membership was decisive for the participation in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. Considering Norway’s ‘dovish’ attitude, one could argue that 
participation in these two cases would have been evaded if it were not for its membership in 
the Alliance. In the case of Libya, there was no reluctance once the broad UN mandate was on 
the table. An argued implication of Norway’s emphasis on idealpolitik and realpolitik is that it 
creates international expectations, which consequently increases the pressure on the 
Norwegian Government to contribute. This finding is consistent with that of Espenes and 
Haug (2012), and suggests that when realpolitik and idealpolitik coincide, as in the case of 
Libya, the possibility for Norway to participate more willingly is greater and that the 
Government can assume a more ‘hawkish’ role. 
Despite the international pressure, there is evidently also room for manoeuvre for small 
states in the decision to deploy armed forces to low-intensity conflicts – perhaps best 
exemplified by the case of Iraq. The leeway is also evident in the other cases but not as clearly 
as in that case, in which Norway refrained from supporting the intervention, despite intense 
US pressure. Although there was not a clear UN mandate, some states interpreted the existing 
UN Resolution in a way that justified the intervention. Hence, as the analysis has shown, 
domestic factors were essential in explaining the outcome in the case of Iraq.  
Domestic factors are more clearly evident regarding the second research question: why 
did Norway contribute in the way it did. By posing national caveats on the contributions, the 
subsequent Norwegian Governments have been able to secure national control and meet 
domestic demands, while facing international pressure to contribute. Hence, whereas the 
decision to participate is explained by international factors, the nature of the contributions is 
explained by domestic factors. The findings furthermore indicate that there is more leeway for 
political parties to influence Norwegian foreign policy – compared to the era in which the 
Soviet threat loomed and consensus was deemed highly important – both in terms of more 
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open debate on the decision to deploy armed forces, and the significance of SV in government 
position. The latter point has arguably led the Norwegian Government to be more restrictive 
in the participation in international military operations. At the same time, the government 
position has also changed SV, at least the party leadership, to be more approving to the use of 
force. 
The public opinion and the media have not played a significant role in the four cases. 
However, if the issue is perceived as important enough, they can have a stronger effect on 
future operations. And, although not decisive in the case of Iraq, the public opinion affected 
the outcome. In the case of the extensive bombing of Libya, one could presume that reactions 
had been stronger if the operation had prolonged in time or had there been many ‘friendly-fire 
incidents’ with the participation of Norwegian F-16s – not to mention if there had been 
Norwegian casualties. Lately, there also seems to have been paid more attention to this case in 
the media. 
Turning to the theoretical framework, the two-level-games model has allowed an 
investigation into Norwegian participation and contributions, and better clarified how 
decisions of deploying armed forces to international operations evidently are affected by 
domestic, as well as international factors. While the model was initially applied to economic 
issues, the two-level-game approach has proved to be useful also in the case of analysing 
security issues. As Putnam was criticised for paying too much attention to the chief 
negotiator’s strategies, the analysis has shown the importance of devoting more consideration 
to the other determinants of the win-set – underlining the complexity of a two-level game. 
6.1 Technological development – the ability 
From Norway’s participation in Kosovo to Libya, there has been an extensive development in 
the Norwegian ability to contribute in international military operations. The Norwegian F-
16’s, which have participated in all three cases, have gone from not having air-to-ground 
capabilities at the time of Kosovo, dropping seven bombs during the two periods in 
Afghanistan, to dropping 569 bombs in Libya – a profound development over only 14 years. 
Moreover, the Norwegian Special Forces has become a sought after capability in NATO and 
an important niche instrument in Norwegian foreign policy (Kohte-Næss 2001; Græger & 
Leira 2005, p. 57). This is confirmed by Sverre Diesen (2013), who explained that Norway’s 
allies know very well what Norwegian forces are good at when it comes to contributing to 
sharp missions. He also pointed to how allies frequently request specific contributions, such 
as air forces or the Telemark Battalion. 
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During the first years after the Cold War, changes to the Norwegian Defence came slowly. 
Since 1999, however, there have been several defence reforms. As outlined in the 2004 
strategic concept for the Defence: 
The Defence is to be developed as a modern, flexible and alliance adapted 
security political tool, aiming at a balance between the Defence’s tasks, structure 
and supply of resources. […] The focus is to secure and promote Norwegian 
interests, through being able to handle a broad spectre of challenges, both 
national and international (Ministry of Defence 2004, p. 68). 
Hence, facing a new international security environment, the Norwegian Defence is to be a 
political tool in the goal of promoting national interests. Moreover, as Norway has lost the 
strategic relevance it had during the Cold War, changes have been necessary as to make 
Norway relevant within NATO, and to face the new security challenges. As stated by former 
Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal (Ap): “if we cannot contribute abroad, then we cannot 
expect help from abroad should we need it” (cited in Græger & Leira 2005, p. 55). 
The ability of Norwegian armed forces in international operations has been affected by 
caveats. The fact that the contributions in Afghanistan had more national caveats than the 
contributions in Kosovo and Libya can be explained by the nature of the operations. In the 
latter two the contributions consisted of F-16s, while the operations in Afghanistan also 
included ground forces; as noted by Saideman and Auerswald (2011), more caveats are given 
when the risk is greater
45
. The Norwegian contribution in Libya did not have particular 
caveats, though this can to a large extent be explained by the technological development as 
the Norwegian F-16s are among the best at precision bombing (Henriksen 2013a, pp. 32-3). 
According to Frisvold (2013), Kosovo has been decisive for the development of the 
Norwegian Defence, stating that without the experiences from Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
Norway could not have executed its part in the operation in Libya as it did. 
Although Norwegian participation in future missions may be more restrictive regarding 
the use of force, an important point is that having new and improved capabilities increases the 
expectations among allies; as Sverre Diesen pointed out: “Having a capability always creates 
expectations” (2013). The Norwegian Government is now in the process of acquiring up to 52 
new F-35 fighter aircrafts, in which four are to be received by the end of 2017 (Ministry of 
Defence 2013b). Presumably this capability will increase international expectations to 
contribute in the future. 
 
                                                 
45
Naturally there is significant risk for the pilots in the F-16s as well, but it differs from the risk that ground 
forces are exposed to. 
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6.2 Use of force – the willingness 
A ‘dovish’ attitude to the use of force is evident in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but the increased 
efforts in the latter case and the Norwegian participation in Libya 2011 indicate a change. In 
2001, Foreign Minister Petersen viewed it as unlikely that Norway would lead an 
international stabilisation force in Afghanistan (NTB 2001c). However, in 2005 this is 
precisely what Norway did, and the reluctance to do more than others had arguably 
disappeared with the Norwegian participation in Libya. Another point that strengthens this 
perception is that the party that has voiced most strongly against military operations, SV, 
approved Norway’s participation in Libya.  
According to neo-realists a change in the polarity of the international system takes time 
for states to comprehend, and they often have an awaiting attitude (Waltz 2000). The 
understanding of the role of Norway in the new security climate is, arguably slowly, changing 
following the experiences of increased participation in international military operations. One 
could argue that the Cold War-era was a better situation for Norway as support from the US 
was guaranteed. Post-1990, however, the security picture is much more diffused, as well as 
Norway’s closest ally is shifting its focus away from Europe (Daalder 2003). The case of 
Libya, in which the US wished for a reduced role, implies that Norway has to give more 
internationally in order to gain something back – and that it is this that now has become 
clearer among Norwegian politicians. 
Through the case studies we can note to some extent adjustment and familiarisation to the 
use of force. There were strong reactions after the first Norwegians bombs in Afghanistan in 
2003, though there seems to be an awakening among politicians regarding the implications of 
Norway’s participation in international military operations. The reality in Afghanistan proved 
to be something other than the political stability and peace rhetoric conveyed by the 
politicians. Diesen (2013) pointed out that for the soldiers on the ground the reality was fights 
and war, but that he noted a shift in 2006/2007 among the politicians in this regard. This is 
supported by Frisvold (2013), who is of the opinion that there has been a changed attitude 
among politicians concerning what they are sending Norwegian forces into. Moreover, 
considering the large Norwegian effort in Libya compared to that in previous operations in 
which Norway had a supportive role, this fact has received relatively little attention; it appears 
that Norway being in the forefront concerning the use of force, is no longer viewed as 
unnatural, neither for the politicians, the public opinion or the media. 
In summary, the focus on diplomacy and political solutions can be identified in all four 
cases, and the term ‘act of war’ has consequently been avoided. Nevertheless, it seems to be 
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an increased realisation among politicians that the use of force is a necessary component in 
order to achieve political solutions; as von Clausewitz wrote: “war is a mere continuation of 
policy by other means” (2007, p. 26). In an interview in the NRK documentary concerning 
Norway’s participation in Libya, Foreign Minister Støre stated that  
[t]he foundation for leading a dialogue is that one is also prepared to use force. 
The difficult question is if one is ready to use force when it is needed. This is 
without doubt Norway’s point of view, and we are good at both (Støre in NRK 
2013). 
Diesen (2013) maintained that the Norwegian contribution has never been meant to be 
decisive. The empirical findings from Kosovo and Afghanistan support this. With Libya, on 
the other hand, the contribution did have an impact on the result. Nevertheless, one should be 
careful to view the case of Libya as the new standard of Norwegian participation in 
international military operations, or that this is how Norway will contribute in future 
operations. As stressed in the analysis, each case is formed by its context, and it is probable 
that Norway will be more restrictive regarding the use of force, e.g. if the grounds for 
justification are more contested, as in the current conflict in Syria. Then again, the Norwegian 
participation in Libya may initiate an exercise of thought among politicians on the goals to be 
achieved by using military force, seeing that Norway, though small, can actually play an 
important part when it comes to the result. Moreover, the fact that Foreign Minister Barth 
Eide so quickly announced the possibility of Norwegian participation in the Mali intervention, 
underlines the willingness of Norway to use its military force internationally. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
Norway still remains dependent on greater powers and the international community. The 
findings of the present thesis suggest that the strong emphasis on NATO and the UN has been 
decisive for the decision-making process in the four cases. Nevertheless, there is also leeway 
for Norway to operate independently, which furthermore opens up for more involvement of 
domestic actors. The limited access to primary sources prevents the answers from being 
conclusive. Nonetheless, we can conclude that there is no longer a party in the Storting that in 
principle is against Norwegian participation in international military operations. From being 
reluctant and clinging to the hope for diplomacy in Kosovo, to the rapid decision to use force 
without national caveats in Libya, there seems to be a new orientation among politicians 
regarding the use of force, through which they will use it increasingly.  
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Appendix A: Norwegian governments from 1997 to present 
Period Government Parties Prime Minister Foreign Minister Defence Minister 
Oct. 1997- March 2000 Bondevik I KrF, Sp, V Kjell Magne Bondevik 
(KrF) 
Knut Vollebæk (KrF) 1997-1999:  
Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (KrF)  
1999-2000:  
Eldbjørg Løwer (V) 
March 2000- Oct. 2001 Stoltenberg I Ap Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) Thorbjørn Jagland (Ap) Bjørn Tore Godal (Ap) 
Oct. 2001- Oct. 2005 Bondevik II KrF, H, V Kjell Magne Bondevik 
(KrF) 
Jan Petersen (H) Kristin Krohn Devold (H) 
Oct. 2005- Stoltenberg II Ap, Sp, SV Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) 2005-2012:  
Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap)  
2012-:  
Espen Barth Eide (Ap)  
2005-2009:  
Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Ap) 
2009-2011:  
Grete Faremo (Ap)  
2011-2012:  
Espen Barth Eide (Ap)  
2012-:  
Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Ap)  
 
Høyre (H) – the Conservative Party 
Venstre (V) – the Liberal Party 
Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) – the Christian People’s Party 
Senterpartiet (Sp) – the Centre Party (former Farmer’s Party) 
Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) – the Labour Party 
Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) – the Socialist Left Party  
88 
 
  
89 
 
Appendix B: Interview guide 
Interview at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment , January 29
th
 2013 
Sverre Diesen – former Chief of Defence from 2005 to  2009  
1) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltakelse i internasjonale 
operasjoner? 
a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltakelse. 
b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya. 
 
2) Kan du si noe om Forsvarets rolle i forhold til departementene og politikere? 
a) Med tanke på en norsk deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner. 
b) Med tanke på hvilken måte Norge bidrar i internasjonale operasjoner. 
 
3) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om evnen og viljen til innsats i Forsvaret? 
a) Har det vært en slitasje i viljen til å bidra? 
 
4) USA og NATO 
a) Hvordan vurderer du Norges handlingsrom i forhold til USA og innad i NATO? 
b) Hvilken betydning har et stadig mer integrert fellesforsvar for Norges handlingsrom? 
c) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO? 
 
5) I St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009), Interesser, ansvar og muligheter, settes det ord på 
idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet 
mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltakelse i de ulike operasjonene? 
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Telephone interview, March 8
th  
2013 
Sigurd Frisvold – former Chief of Defence from 1999 to 2005  
1) Kosovo 
a) Hvordan oppfattet du Norges holdning til situasjonen i Kosovo? 
b) Hvilke erfaringer vil du trekke fram som viktige fra Operation Allied Force? 
c) Etter din oppfatning, kunne Norge ha bidratt mer i Kosovo om det hadde vært vilje for 
det? 
 
2) Afghanistan 
a) Betydningen av erfaringene fra Kosovo 
b) Hvordan vurderer du utviklingen i Norges bidrag i Afghanistan? 
 
3) USA og NATO 
a) Hvordan vurderer du Norges handlingsrom i forhold til USA og innad i NATO? 
b) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO? 
i) Har det endret seg? 
 
4) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om evnen og viljen til innsats i Forsvaret? 
 
5) I St.meld nr. 15 (2008-2009), Interesser, ansvar og muligheter, settes det ord på 
idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet 
mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltakelse i de ulike operasjonene? 
 
6) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltakelse i internasjonale 
operasjoner? 
a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltakelse. 
b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya. 
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Interview at the Storting, 30
th
 January 2013 
Morten Høglund – parliamentarian from the Progress Party,  and member in 
DUUK/DUUFK from 2001 until present  
1) Etter din vurdering, har det vært en utvikling i norsk deltakelse i internasjonale 
operasjoner? 
a) Med hensyn til prosessene frem mot en avgjørelse om norsk deltakelse. 
b) Med hensyn til det norske bidraget i henholdsvis Kosovo, Afghanistan og Libya. 
 
2) Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om hvordan Norge oppfattes av allierte i NATO? 
 
3) Hva er Stortingets rolle i vurderingen av en norsk deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner? 
a) Opplever du at det er en økt grad av debatt rundt norsk deltakelse i Stortinget? 
 
4) Folkeopinionens innflytelse 
a) Hvor stor påvirkning har folkeopinionen vedrørende en norsk deltakelse? 
b) Vil du si at det har vært en utvikling i tankegangen rundt norske militæres bidrag 
internasjonalt? 
 
5) Uavhengig av partier, hvilke tanker gjør du deg om kontinuiteten i Norges forsvars- og 
sikkerhetspolitikk? 
a) Med et økt antall internasjonale operasjoner, oppfatter du at forholdet mellom de 
norske aktørene i forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikken har endret seg? 
b) Dersom det blir et regjeringsskifte i år, vil dette være av betydning for norsk deltakelse 
i internasjonale operasjoner? 
 
6) I St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009), Interesser, ansvar og muligheter, settes det ord på 
idealpolitikk og realpolitikk i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Hvordan vurderer du styrkeforholdet 
mellom disse i begrunnelsene for norsk deltakelse i de ulike operasjonene? 
 
 
